Musubi to Constructed Emotions: Japanese Traditions and the Relational Shaping of Feeling

Introduction

The modern synthesis of constructivist framework which emphasises the cultural, social, and contextual nature of emotional experience (Barrett, 2017a; Barrett, 2017b; Mesquita, 2022) represents a great shift away from the previous essentialist views, and reshaped our understanding of emotions. This framework suggests in fact that emotions are not innate, biologically fixed responses, but are actively constructed through cognitive, social and cultural processes (Mesquita and Frijda, 2011; Barrett, 2017b). Crucially, constructivism does not deny biological foundations. Rather, it recognises that while core affect and embodied sensations have universal biological substrates across humans, the experience and interpretation of these physiological states varies culturally. Emotions as culturally specific categories emerge through the dynamic interaction of these biological substrates with culturally acquired concepts and social contexts. This bio-cultural perspective distinguishes constructivism from naive social constructionism, positioning emotions as fundamentally shaped by both biological capacity and cultural meaning-making rather than one or the other. It is important to emphasise that recognising cultural differences in emotional categories does not imply hierarchical ranking or supremacy. Rather, constructivism specifically rejects such hierarchies by demonstrating that all cultures develop sophisticated, adaptive emotional frameworks suited to their social and ecological contexts. Emotional diversity across cultures represents different solutions to universal human needs, not evidence of emotional richness or poverty. Thus, this framework challenges the essentialist assumption that views emotion as universal, automatic reactions, underlining instead their dynamic, context-dependent, and culturally driven nature.

In particular, according to constructivism, emotions are actively constructed through dynamic interactions between biological processes, cultural meaning, and social contexts, making them a socio-biocultural product. As Barrett and Lida (2025) argue, social constructivism suggests that emotions derive from social and cultural ingredients, while psychological constructionism sees emotion as psychological processes. These two approaches—as exemplified in conceptual act theory—are not mutually exclusive, but do actually reinforce each other, suggesting that “the human mind transforms feelings of effect into instances of emotion by categorising them with situation- specific, embodied emotion concepts” (Barrett and Lida, 2025, p. 352). Moreover, as Mesquita et al. suggest “emotions are iterative and active constructions that help an individual achieve the central goals and tasks in a given (cultural) context” (2016, p. 34).

In referring to Japanese emotion (kanjō), Takashima (2000) suggests that emotions depend on the worldview of people, underlining that the different worldviews of ancient Japanese and modern Japanese entail different emotions. At the same time, he points out that it is a shared worldview that allows for a better sharing of emotions. Takashima’s idea that emotions are both culturally shared (relational) and individually subjective (individual), and shaped by historical dynamism, leads to the validation of the idea that no universal Japanese emotion exists across a temporal, local, or social context. This does not mean that there are no shared instances of emotions, but simply underlines that the cultural context shapes this understanding, and—being a product of worldview dynamism and personal subjectivity—emotions are never an either/or dichotomy. This principle is in line with constructivist theories.

While constructivism may be considered as a relatively recent development within Western psychology, historical traditions such as Shinto and Buddhism in Japan offer conceptual frameworks that resemble the one proposed by constructivism. Of course, within resemblance also comes clashes that cannot be easily resolved. One such clash concerns the anthropocentric nature of constructivist emotion theory. According to Barrett (2024), emotions are human-exclusive phenomena, primarily because they require linguistic scaffolding to acquire culturally specific goal-concepts and neurocognitive prediction to map bodily states—interoception (Barrett and Quigley, 2021)—to abstract categories. As Barrett explains, “the brain constructs meaning by correctly anticipating (predicting and adjusting to) incoming sensations. Sensations are categorised so that they are (1) actionable in a situated way and therefore (2) meaningful, based on past experience. When past experiences of emotion (e.g., happiness) are used to categorise the predicted sensory array and guide action, then one experiences or perceives that emotion (happiness)” (2017b, p. 10). These capabilities are absent in non-humans.

This theory appears in radical opposition, as an instance, with Shinto’s worldview where kami—the spirits of natural phenomena and objects (Ono, 1962)—possess emotions analogous to humans. Buddhist doctrine of pan-sentience, according to which mental factors (JPN: shinjo) belong to all sentient creatures, may be perceived as opposing the view of constructionism. The discrepancy between constructivism and Shinto or Buddhism reveals basic ontological differences between these two systems, which, however, stem from different epistemological foundations. Barrett’s framework works on neurocognitive paradigms (Barrett, 2017b) where emotion requires cortical predictive processing, while Shinto and Buddhism frame emotions as emergent phenomena arising from sacred/natural relational engagement (Shinto) or conditioned impermanence (Buddhism). To reconcile this rift, it is first necessary to understand that these are not two competing truths, but complementary frameworks. As an example, while constructivism explains the mechanism of human emotional construction, these Japanese traditions describe the experiential continuum of sentient existence, seeing emotion in their relational or cultural form—not different in the way in which psychological constructivism is complementary to social constructivism.

This article explores how these Japanese traditions, through their philosophy and ritual practices, demonstrating interesting convergences with key principles of constructivist emotion theories, developed independently across different epistemological foundations, and critically examines the validity of positioning them not as direct precursors, but as an important framework to be integrated into modern constructivism. To be clear, this research does not propose that modern constructivism stems from Japanese religious thought. It suggests only that Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianist understanding of emotional experience show interesting convergence with the constructivist principle, that should be taken seriously in consideration. Through a careful analysis of Japanese traditional concepts such musubi (connective energy) (Hara, 2003), kegare (ritual pollution) (Namihira, 1984; 1987), and the Buddhist theory of vedanā (feeling-tone) (Batchelor, 2018), this analysis identifies a framework for understanding emotions as relational, contextual, and culturally embedded phenomena. This convergence suggests that some of the constructivist insights may represent culturally shared features of human emotional understanding, rather than a culture-specific Western innovation.

Theoretical Foundations of Constructivism

The constructivist approach to emotion developed from different intellectual roots directly challenging the faculty psychology (Barrett and Russell, 2015) and basic emotion theory, by offering a different perspective on understanding “how… an emotional episode [is] made” (Barrett and Russell, 2015, p. 8). Gendron and Barrett (2009) explain how Herbert Spencer articulated foundational constructivist principles as early as 1855, arguing that emotions and cognition arise from the same psychological processes and cannot be meaningfully separated. Spencer’s insight that emotional experiences always involve representation of past experiences, foreshadowed the modern constructivist emphasis on the role of learning and cultural transmission in emotional development (Gendron and Barrett, 2009). Vygotsky’s work also highlighted how emotions develop through social processes, suggesting they arise from the interplay between historical experiences and present environmental factors. This perspective reimagined emotions as dynamic creations rather than simple automatic responses (Vygotsky, 1999), establishing the foundation for later social constructivist theoretical developments.

Successively, Jerome Bruner extended these insights by proposing that human learning involves the construction of new ideas based on current knowledge, emphasising the cultural transmission of cognitive and emotional framework (Woodhouse, 2017). Culture is one of the fundamental aspects of constructivism, and one of the points in which the discrepancy with basic emotion theory is bigger. The contribution of Hochschild is also of fundamental importance. Her work demonstrated, in fact, that people actively manage their feeling based on social rules, rather than experiencing them passively. Her research (Hochschild, 1979; 1983) demonstrated that emotions follow cultural guidelines about what we should feel in different situations. Exemplary in this is her volume The Managed Heart (1983) in which she shows how people in customer service jobs must control their emotions to please customers, treating feeling as tools rather than natural reactions. Her work is widely used in Japan, for example, when discussing emotional work (kanjō rōdō). Hochschild’s research reveals in fact that emotions are socially regulated experiences that people actively produce and adjust according to their environment, which include also the cultural expectation of their emotional expression. These findings directly connect to today’s understanding of emotions as constructed experiences rather than automatic responses. 

More recently, constructivism has been synthesised in Lisa Feldman Barrett’s theory of constructed emotions (Barrett, 2006; 2008; 2017a; 2017b) which integrated insights from neurosciences, psychology, and cultural studies. The theory of Barrett—which is indeed one of the major and most important authorities in the field—may be thought as the culmination of constructivist thought, positing that emotions are not biologically predetermined responses but mental constructions arising from the interaction between physiological sensations and conceptual knowledge acquired through socialisation (Barrett, 2017a). According to this framework, the brain continuously creates emotional experiences by interpreting bodily sensations through culturally specific emotion concepts, thus explaining the variability in emotional experiences across cultures (Barrett, 2017a). This predictive processing framework suggests that emotions emerge when the brain categorises internal sensory inputs using concept knowledge acquired through cultural learning and experience, making emotions cultural rather than universal phenomena. Importantly, this process is not merely cognitive categorisation, but lived experience: the phenomenological dimension of emotion involves how individuals experience their bodily states through culturally specific frameworks, making each emotional episode a dynamic moment of meaning-making rather than a predetermined response. I want to underline, however, that while specific emotion categories, and their instances, are cultural, the capacity for affective experience remains virtually present in all humans.

Together with Barrett’s theory, another important framework is the socio-cultural theory, of which Batja Mesquita is one of the major exponents. According to this framework, emotions are primarily social and cultural construction, rather than universal biological phenomena (Mesquita, 2003; 2022; Mesquita, Boiger, and De Leersnyder, 2016; Mesquita, Boiger, and De Leersnyder; 2017; Mesquita and Parkinson, 2025). While different social constructionist ideas may suggest different ways in which the process of construction of emotions works, Mesquita and Parkison (2025) individuates five claims to which all the theories—at least in part—agree. These are multicomponentiality, dependence on social cognition, cultural specificity, activity, and social functionality. In short, they suggest that social constructionists view emotions not as universal passive responses separate from cognition, but as phenomena constituted through social-relational processes within cultural contexts (Mesquita and Parkinson, 2025, p. 389). A particular aspect of these theories, the social functionality, underlines how emotions serve social relationships and cultural values. Mesquita and Boiger (2014) argue that emotions are not merely internal experiences, but practices that help individuals navigate their social worlds and uphold cultural norms. This perspective shifts the attention from emotion as individual psychological states to emotions as relational phenomena shaped by cultural contexts. Mesquita and al. (2016), posit that emotions vary across cultures not just in their expression, but in their very nature and function. With her research, Mesquita (2003; 2022; Mesquita and Leu, 2007) demonstrates that emotions are ‘culturally patterned’ in that they reflect and reproduce cultural models of selfhood, relationships, and morality. This means, as an example, that within cultural and philosophical systems emphasising interdependence—such as those exemplified in Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian traditions—emotions often function to maintain group harmony and signal commitment to relationships. Conversely, in cultural frameworks emphasising individualism, emotions more frequently serve to express personal needs and boundaries (Mesquita et al., 2016). The impact of culture is also shown by the concept of ‘emotional acculturation’ (De Leersnyder and al., 2011), which describes the way in which immigrants’ emotional patterns gradually shift to resemble those of their host culture through sustained social contact.

Another very important concept introduced by Mesquita (2022) distinguishes emotions into two types: MINE (Mental, INside the person, and Essentialist) and OURS (OUtside the person, Relational, and Situated). Importantly, these frameworks describe how emotions are conceptualised and constructed within cultural systems, not categorical types of cultures themselves. The MINE model conceptualises emotions as individual mental properties—internal states that reveal one’s true self through expression. By contrast, the OURS model frames emotions as fundamentally relational and contextual: they emerge through social interaction, are shaped by situational factors, and are evaluated based on their social consequences rather than their authenticity (Mesquita, 2022). With "essentialist" she means that MINE emotions are assumed to have invariant properties across contexts, while "situated" means OURS emotions take different forms depending on relational and contextual factors. This distinction is an important advancement in the understanding of cultural variations in emotional experience. MINE emotions are conceptualised as internal mental states that occur primarily within the individuals, with expression serving as a way to communicate these states. This view of emotion is the one prevalent in Western psychological frameworks and cultural practices. OURS emotions instead reflect those cultural practices in which emotions are seen as co-created through relationships and social contexts. With this framework, Mesquita doesn’t claim a binary split in which all Western individuals elusively experience MINE emotions, or non-western experience solely OURS emotions. She suggests instead that cultural prioritises one model as the normative framework for understanding emotions. Individuals within any culture can exhibit both, but cultural norms address which model is dominant (Mesquita, 2022). The importance of this framework is that it may help to explain why emotional concepts, experiences, and regulation strategies differ systematically across cultures. In MINE-oriented cultures, emotional authenticity and self-expression are valued, with emotions seen as revealing one’s true self. Consequently, emotional regulation often focuses on managing internal states to align with personal goals. In OURS-oriented frameworks—as exemplified in Japanese Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian traditions—emotions are understood as being evaluated based on their relational consequences rather than their authenticity. Consequently, regulation strategies prioritise interpersonal harmony over self-expression (Mesquita, 2022; Mesquita and Boiger, 2014; Mesquita et al., 2016).

The theory of constructed emotions and the socio-cultural theory, despite some differences, function in synergy to demonstrate how emotions are essentially biocultural products. While the psychologist constructivist framework highlights how emotions are built neurocognitively, the socio-cultural framework shows their cultural distinction and social functions. Interestingly, Uchida, Nakayama, and Bowen’s (2022) concept of interdependence of emotion (IOE) supports the OURS socio-cultural framework, in particular outside WEIRD psychological framework. Uchida et al. underline that “IOE is not a label or category of emotion. Rather, IOE exists as a continuum of whether emotions are understood as interdependent and can be socially shared” (2022, p. 3). They suggest, for example, that in those contexts in which agency is conjoint—Japan, as example—emotions are more likely to be understood as characteristic of IOE, and by consequence, also OURS. Moreover, Uchida and al. define IOE “not only through its social function but also through its emergence, including how and when we feel emotions that guide the self” (2022, p. 6), hence seeing emotions as intrinsically relational rather than merely internal states, and diverging from essentialist frameworks.

Japanese religious traditions and emotional understanding.

The interdependent construction of emotion—emerging from social contexts rather than isolated minds—parallels core principles in Japanese traditional frameworks, particularly Shinto and Buddhism. Shinto explicitly conceptualises emotions as arising within relational contexts (e.g., communal rituals or kami interactions), rejecting individual-centric models. This perspective, shared across Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian traditions, reflects a distinctive understanding that resonates with contemporary constructivist theories. Following Takashima (2000), this study adopts a tripartite division of Japanese thought into these three streams for analytical clarity. While this framework unavoidably simplifies historical and contextual complexities, it offers a necessary structure for this study. Similarly, umbrella terms like Japanese traditions or Japanese thought are used for fluency, despite imperfectly capturing the religious, philosophical, and socio-ethical nuances embedded in these systems.

Japanese traditions have approached the phenomenon of emotion, revealing frameworks that position emotions not as universal biological responses, but as culturally mediated relational phenomena embedded within specific worldviews (Takashima, 2000). Shinto, for example, offers a relational view of emotion that contrasts sharply with Western existentialist views and strongly aligns with Mesquita’s (2022) OURS framework and Uchida and al.’s (2022) IOE framework. Central to Shinto’s understanding of emotions, in fact, is the concept of musubi, the connective energy that binds humans, kami, and natural phenomena (Hara, 2003). This concept position emotions not as internal psychological states—hence related to MINE framework—but as emergent proprieties arising from relational dynamics between consciousness, spiritual reality, and environmental context (Takashima, 2000). Recent comparative scholarship has documented how Shinto emotional concepts differ fundamentally from Western frameworks. Takó (2019) analyses how Shinto notions of love (ai) emphasise interconnectedness and relational embedding rather than individual feeling states. This contrasts sharply with MINE-oriented models in which emotions are conceived as internal psychological properties to be expressed or managed. Instead, Shinto frameworks position love and other emotions as emergent from sacred encounter—the dynamic engagement between humans, kami, and natural world. This understanding aligns directly with Mesquita’s OURS framework and demonstrates that Shinto traditions anticipated contemporary relational models of emotion centuries before their formal theorisation in Western psychology. Early Japanese worldview did not compartmentalise emotions as discrete internal states, but situated them within a dynamic interplay of Kokoro (heart, meaning both heart and mind), natural phenomena, and communal rituals. As Takashima (2000) suggests, worldview represents the relationship between heart (Kokoro) as consciousness, and heart (Kokoro)—which Takashima report also with same kanji—as external reality perceived through cultural and spiritual frameworks. This relation is what musubi means.

The concept of kegare (impurity) may exemplify how the Shinto framework externalises emotions into collective ritual actions. As Namihira (1984; 1987) demonstrates in her analysis of pollution beliefs, kegare arises not only from physical contamination, but from perceived ruptures in social and spiritual harmony. This rupture requires a communal purification like harae (Namihira, 1984; 1987). Kegare, hence, represents a structural disruption of musubi, arising both passively (e.g., death) and through active actions or taboos (e.g., blood contact), yet carries no moral culpability. Unlike tsumi (sin)—which requires atonement for ethical breaches—kegare calls for ritual rectification to restore the relational value of communal harmony. This ritual externalisation of emotion (kegare → harae) exemplifies Mesquita’s (2022) claim that OURS emotions “regulate relationships.” This distinction also reveals how this framework conceptualised impurity not as ethical failure, but as an ontological disturbance in cosmic-social order. There is no moral judgement of actions or events as good or bad. Instead, there are phenomena that please or displease the kami, or in emotional terms, that make the kami happy or angry.

A disruption of musubi creates a rupture in the connection with nature and kami, affecting the community and disrupting social relationship. Thus, kegare may be seen as both individual and collective. The concept of kannagara-no-michi (lit. the way of following the kami), emphasises instead the importance of living in harmony with divine principles and natural order. This intertwines with emotion through the Shinto’s focus on experiential spirituality, ritual practice, and harmony with nature. It does, hence, institutionalise emotions as relational and social processes. Matsuri (festivals), for instance, synchronise communal affect through actions such as drumming and dance, fostering collective joy. The joy of matsuri—also from my personal experience—stems from the social functions of events, which are bringing together the community with the kami. As a last note, being animistic at its core, Shinto cultivates emotional response to natural phenomena, such as the awe toward waterfalls, or reverence for ancient trees. This sensitivity to surroundings is a psychological trait of Japanese spirituality, as explored by Kasulis (2004), who highlights the relational nature of this sensitivity. This perspective aligns with IOE and OURS frameworks. Reverence toward Nature, in this sense, extends the OURS framework beyond human-only relationships, strengthening the importance of this constructivist concept.

The Buddhist influence on Japanese views on the concept of emotions represents another layer of complexity. Buddhism was officially introduced to Japan in the mid-6^th century, bringing with it a sophisticated framework for understanding mental states and emotional experience, along with cultural influence from India, China, and Korea (Deal and Ruppert, 2015). Buddhist teaching on impermanence (anicca) and suffering (dukkha), reshaped Japanese emotional frameworks, particularly through concept such as so-called mono-no-aware—which is a melancholic appreciation of life’s transience that became central to Heian-era aesthetics. Mono-no-aware represents sensitivity to ephemerality, and is rooted in the Buddhist doctrine of anicca (Bilimoria and Wenta, 2015. Anicca is mujō in Japanese). This sensitivity merged with the already present Shintoist sensitivity for nature, to create a distinct emotional lexicon that gave value to fleeting beauty amid decay, as symbolised by cherry blossoms and seasonal poetry.

The Abhidhammic analysis of emotions as cultivated mental dispositions (saṃkhāra) (Tripathi, 2015) suggests that Japanese Buddhist practices aimed at dissolving negative traits like attachment (rāga) through mindful attention (yoniso manasikāro) rather than suppression. While Buddhism traditionally views emotions as products of attachment and ignorance (moha) that perpetuate suffering, Japanese practice integrated these emotions into spiritual awakening through aesthetic refinement and contemplation of impermanence (mujō). Heine (1998) suggests that medieval Japanese Buddhism rejected rigid separations between emotional engagement and spiritual detachment, instead positioning emotions like melancholy and joy as vehicles for realising enlightenment through embodied, impermanent experiences (sokushin jōbutsu). This integration of emotion into spiritual practice reflects a deeper transformation of Buddhist doctrine within Japanese contexts. Masaki (2022) demonstrates how Japanese Buddhism developed the concept of ‘enlightenment of nonsentient beings’ (busshitsu-setsu) specifically to incorporate emotional and relational dimensions into Buddhist thought, merging it with indigenous Shinto animism. This doctrinal shift meant that emotions and their cultivation became central to spiritual realisation rather than obstacles to overcome. The relational and affective dimensions of Japanese Buddhist practice thus differ markedly from classical Indian Buddhist frameworks, revealing how Buddhist emotional understanding adapted and evolved through cultural synthesis. This Japanese Buddhist approach positions emotions not as individual psychological states to be suppressed, but as relational phenomena emerging from one’s engagement with all sentient and non-sentient beings. Through the use of literal expressions (e.g., waka poetry) and rituals, practitioners reframed afflictive emotions as gateways to perceiving reality as it is (arinomama), where transient phenomena became a mirror of Buddha-likeness. This approach is exemplified in Yoshida Kenko’s Tsurezuregursa (c.1330), where he reflects on the fleeting nature of human existences. In particular, in the seventh chapter, he advocates for an emotional appreciation of impermanence, criticising those people who, clinging to prolonged life, are ignorant of the “joy of dying” (Yoshida, 1977).

Buddhism lacks a direct equivalent to Western concepts of emotions. Instead, it categorises mental states into those that promote well-being (shuka, or raku in Japanese), and those that cause suffering (dukka, or ku in Japanese) (BSKK, 1980; Ekman,and al., 2005). In the case of Buddhism, like for Shinto, there is not an idea of mental states as inherently good or bad. Instead, Buddhism evaluates them based on their contribution toward suffering or liberation. The concept of feeling-tone (vedanā) represents the qualitative aspect of the experience—pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—that serve as the foundation for emotional development (Batchelor, 2018). Buddhism framework, hence, evaluates emotions based on their long-term consequences rather than immediate qualities, rejecting essentialist categorisations in favour of contextual assessment (Batchelor, 2018).

Beyond philosophical frameworks, ethnographic scholarship on Japanese Buddhist ritual practices demonstrates how emotional understandings are embodied in lived experience. LaFleur (1992) and Hardacre (1997) analyse the practice of mizuko kuyo, a Buddhist memorial ritual addressing grief, guilt, and maternal ambivalence surrounding miscarriage and induced abortion. These scholars reveal how Buddhist temples provide structured, communal means of processing complex emotions—demonstrating that emotions in Buddhist contexts emerge through ritual engagement rather than as isolated individual states. This evidence substantiates the constructivist claim that emotions are socially constituted phenomena, with the mizuko kuyo ritual exemplifying how Buddhist frameworks position emotions as relational practices.

The Confucian influence on Japanese emotional understanding represents a third significant strand, particularly through concepts of proper emotional cultivation (jōsei) within social relationships. Ichikawa (1974) explains how the Confucianist thought conceptualise emotion as a function or expression of human nature, putting them is a strong relationship. According to this view, emotions are cultivated through self-cultivation, rituals, and the pursuit of virtues. It appears clear that culture plays a strong influence in this process. This view suggests, hence, that emotions are not internal states, but cultivated, regulated, and expressed in ways that serve ethical and social harmony (Li, 2023). In particular, Ichikawa (1974) suggests that emotions are seen as the performative enactment of human nature in concrete situations. They are constitutive of thought and action, and their ethical significance emerges only within the relational and ritualised context of everyday life. The heart (kokoro) is always in motion, oscillating between the human heart and the moral heart. The first one is tied to individual desires and physicality, while the other is aligned with the original nature, the one endowed by Heaven.

Hence, the Confucian tradition brought to Japan a sophisticated vocabulary for discussing emotions within ethical frameworks. For instance, the concept of jin (benevolence) represented not merely an abstract virtue, but an embodied emotional disposition cultivated through proper ritual practice and social interaction (Tachibana and Nakazawa, 2023). Confucian influences on Japanese emotional understanding are particularly evident in concepts like on (debt of gratitude) and giri (social obligation). These concepts frame emotions like gratitude and obligation not as spontaneous feelings but as cultivated dispositions essential to maintaining social cohesion. The emotional dimensions of these concepts reveal how Confucian thought positioned emotions as fundamentally relational phenomena that emerge through and sustain proper social relations. This approach to emotion contributed significantly to the development of culturally specific display rules in Japanese society, where the appropriate expression of emotion is determined by social context rather than individual preference. Confucian emphasis on emotional propriety established frameworks for understanding emotions as socially constructed phenomena rather than universal biological responses.

The synthesis of Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian influences in Japanese culture created hybrid emotional frameworks that resist reduction of any single tradition. These syncretic approaches demonstrate how emotional understanding emerges through the dynamic interaction of multiple cultural influences, supporting claims about the cultural specificity of emotional categories. Japanese conceptualisations of emotion are deeply embedded in cultural practices and linguistic expressions that often differ markedly from Western frameworks. For instance, the Japanese concept of amae, which describes a form of dependent attachment (Doi, 1971), has no direct equivalent in Western emotional taxonomies. Similarly, concepts like omoiyari, which encompasses empathetic concern and anticipatory attention to others’ needs, and kanjin, referring to emotional resonance within social relationships, illustrate how Japanese emotional understanding is deeply intertwined with interpersonal awareness. These concepts reflect a cultural emphasis on emotions as inherently relational phenomena rather than purely individual experiences. The Japanese emotional lexicon thus reveals how feelings emerge from and contribute to social harmony, a perspective that enriches our global understanding of emotional processes. Linguistic analysis of Japanese emotion terminology substantiates these observations. Hasada (2000) demonstrates through semantic metalanguage analysis that Japanese emotional concepts are fundamentally organised around relational and contextual dimensions rather than internal psychological states.

Convergent Principles: Ancient Wisdom and Modern Theory

These Japanese traditions present complex frameworks that show interesting connections with modern constructivist theories of emotion, both psychological and socio-cultural constructivism. This alignment emerges particularly in their shared rejection of essentialism and the emphasis on relationality and context, positioning emotion as dynamic biocultural constructs rather than fixed biological universals (Barrett and Lida, 2025). These parallel concepts that transcend cultural and temporal borders may suggest that certain insights about emotional experiences may represent a wider understanding of emotion, rather than a culturally—Western in this case—specific innovation. This section will try to make clear what these connections are.

Modern constructivist theories of emotions, as said, reject essentialist views that treat emotion as universal biological responses, suggesting rather that emotions are culturally mediated relational phenomena shaped by social contexts (Barrett, 2017a). Japanese traditions developed parallel frameworks that align with contemporary constructivist insights, emerging from distinct philosophical and spiritual foundations rather than historical causation. This emerges, for example, when considering that both constructivist theories and these Japanese traditions reject individualistic conceptions of emotions in favour or relational models that emphasise interpersonal dynamics and cultural contexts. Shinto’s concept of musubi positions emotions as emergent properties of relational dynamics between consciousness, spiritual reality, and environmental context, where emotions co-arise through human-kami-Nature interactions rather than residing within individuals (Takashima, 2000; Hara, 2003). This concept parallels Barrett’s (2017b) focus on emotions as emergent properties of social interaction. Similarly, a Buddhist view of interdependence and the relational nature of suffering aligns with Mesquita and al.’s (2017) rejection of bounded, individual emotional categories, particularly through the OUrs (relational) emotion framework (Mesquita, 2022). Emotions in Buddhism are understood not as isolated mental states, but as processes emerging from the interaction of mental factors, social contexts, and karmic conditions. Confucian approaches further emphasise the cultivation of proper emotional disposition within social relationships, giving emotion a social function. As Tachibana and Nakazawa (2023) noted, in fact, benevolence is an emotional disposition that is cultivated through social interactions. Moreover, as Ichikawa (1974) suggests, Confucianism sees emotions not only as function but also as an expression of this disposition, making emotions a process that is outside the person, as conceived by Mesquita (2022). This view, moreover, aligns with Uchida and al.’s (2022) IOE model, which frames emotions as conjoint agency emerging between people rather than within them.

Context-dependent emotional meaning represents another crucial convergence point. Buddhist evaluation of emotions based on outcomes rather than intrinsic qualities is in line with Barrett’s (2017a) emphasis on the situational and cultural specificity of emotional significance. In Buddhist frameworks, emotions are categorised into those that promote well-being (sukha) and those that cause suffering (dukkha), with their evaluation based on long-term consequences rather than immediate qualities (Batchelor, 2018). This approach rejects essentialist categorisations in favour of contextual assessment, aligning with the constructivist idea of the adaptive value of emotions within specific cultural environments. Both traditions emphasise embodied approaches to emotional understanding that rejects mind-body dualism. Shinto practices such as matsuri festivals and purification rituals treat the body as a site of meaning-making and emotional construction. Emotion, according to Barrett (2017a) is important to give meaning to experiences. Through synchronised drumming, dance, and ritual movement, these practices foster collective emotional experiences that move beyond the individual psychology. Again, Buddhist meditation practices emphasise the role of embodied awareness in transforming emotional experience. This is in line with the neuroscientific insights about the role of interoception (Barrett and Quigley, 2021) in emotional construction. Finally, the Buddhist concept of vedanā (feeling-tone) represents the qualitative aspect of experience—pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—that serves as the foundation for emotional development (Batchelor, 2018). This embodied orientation aligns with Barrett’s (2017a) emphasis on the integration of bodily states and cultural concepts in emotional experience. In both views, emotions emerge from experience, and help to make sense of the experience.

The dynamic and processual nature of emotional understanding represents a final convergence point. Japanese religious traditions emphasise the impermanent and constantly changing nature of emotional experience, rejecting static categorisations in favour of process-oriented frameworks. The synthesis of Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian influences in Japanese culture created hybrid emotional frameworks that resist reduction of any single tradition. This syncretic approach demonstrates how emotional understanding emerges through the dynamic interaction of multiple cultural influences, supporting Uchida et al.’s (2022) claim about cultural specificity and conjoint agency in emotional categories. Japanese conceptualisations of emotion are deeply embedded in cultural practices and linguistic expressions that often differ markedly from Western frameworks. These independent developments of similar frameworks across vastly different cultural and historical contexts suggest that constructivist principles may reflect fundamental aspects of emotional reality rather than Western theoretical preferences. By examining these Japanese conceptualisations of emotion, indeed, we could gain valuable insights into how emotions are constructed, expressed, and regulated within specific cultural contexts, enriching our global understanding of emotional processes (Barrett, 2017a; Mesquita et al., 2016; Uchida et al., 2022).

Critical Examination: Challenges to the Thesis

While the parallels between Japanese religious traditions and constructivist emotion theories present interesting connections, several significant challenges require a critical examination. It is important to analyse such challenges, and try to solve them, before concluding. First, there is a risk of anachronistic interpretation when applying contemporary theoretical frameworks to historical traditions. Shinto, Buddhism, Confucianism on one side, and constructivism on the other, are separated by centuries. Projecting modern constructivist concepts into ancient religious systems may distort their original meanings and contexts of such traditions, creating false equivalences that overstate similarities (Shweder, 2012). Japanese religious traditions developed within specific historical, social, and cultural contexts that differ fundamentally from those shaping modern psychological theories (Earhart, 2014). Attributing contemporary constructivist insights to these traditions may impose conceptual frameworks that would have been unknown to ancient Japanese. Moreover, Takashima (2000) specifies that emotions are dependent on the worldview of the people, underlining that the worldview of ancient Japanese was radically different from that of modern Japanese. It is also important to acknowledge that modern Japanese thoughts and ideas about emotions align more closely with Western ideas than traditional ones. Furthermore, the historical development of Japanese religious traditions reveals complex syncretism rather than unified theoretical frameworks. Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism underwent centuries of mutual influence, adaptation, and reinterpretation within Japanese culture, producing multifaceted religious systems (Reader, 2005) rather than coherent emotion theories. Extracting consistent emotional principles from these diverse traditions risks the oversimplification and selective reading that emphasises elements aligning with constructivist approaches while neglecting contradictory aspects.

Second, methodological concerns arise regarding cross-cultural comparison and translation. The linguistic and conceptual differences between Japanese religious or emotional terminology and contemporary psychological vocabulary may present significant barriers to create valid theoretical connections. Terms like musubi, vedanā, and mono no aware emerge from complex cultural systems with distinctive epistemological foundations that resist straightforward translation into Western psychological concepts (Wierzbicka, 1999). Moreover, Buddhism and Confucianism are not indigenous theories of Japan. Words like vedanā (Sanskrit) were adapted to fit a Japanese context already centuries ago, underlining how the original meaning may be different. However, even if we consider Buddhism starting from the Japanese interpretation, the risk of conceptual colonialism remains high when Japanese concepts are redefined through Western scientific frameworks, potentially depriving them of their original cultural resonance and meaning (Henrich and al., 2010). This is underlined by Muto and Shirai (2024), who noted that Japanese scholars have yet fully to define kanjō—or even reach consensus on whether the term corresponds to the English concepts of affect, emotion, or feeling. This definitional uncertainty stems partly from Japanese psychology’s heavy reliance on Western frameworks, which has overshadowed local perspectives on kanjō (Muto and Shirai, 2024, p. 7).

Third, the difference between epistemological approaches presents a serious challenge. Japanese religious traditions primarily developed through contemplative practice, ritual observance, and philosophical reflection (Kasulis, 2004) rather than empirical research methodologies. Contemporary constructivist theories, on the other hand, rely on experimental evidence, neuroimaging studies, and statistical analysis. These divergent approaches to knowledge production may lead us to questions about the validity of their resulting insights. Hence, it may be difficult to determine whether apparent similarities reflect theoretical convergence or superficial resemblances between fundamentally different modes of understanding (Kirmayer, 2007). Furthermore, it is important to underline that the idea that Japanese religious traditions anticipated constructivist insights faces challenges from alternative historical narratives. Western philosophical traditions, from Aristotle’s rhetoric to Spinoza’s ethics and Nietzsche’s perspectivism, also contain elements that parallel constructivist approaches to emotion (Solomon, 2007). The selective focus on Japanese traditions may reflect my confirmation bias rather than a comprehensive assessment of philosophical antecedents to constructivist theory. Moreover, the historical influences that shaped contemporary constructivist theories trace more directly to Western philosophical and psychological traditions, raising doubt about the validity of the connection between Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian thought with modern constructivism.

Resolution: Validating the Framework

The criticisms I presented above are, of course, limited by my perspective and analytical focus, representing only minor possible criticism. I must also acknowledge that these critiques emerge from my particular lens and may not fully capture the complex dynamics involved in connecting Japanese traditional views on emotion with modern constructivism. Moreover, the article presented only selected aspects of complex traditions such as Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism—specifically those where I noticed resemblances. Aspects that might contrast with constructivism were not considered. This makes it impossible to avoid a certain degree of selective engagement or bias in the theory. Nevertheless, connecting Japanese traditional views and modern constructivism remains a valid effort that may enrich our understanding of emotions as biocultural phenomena. This is because these homologies reveal bio-cognitive patterns in emotion construction, rather than representing imposed analogies. My next step is hence to try to solve the critics I proposed.

First, it is necessary to address the anachronism problem. The modern Japanese worldview differs significantly from ancient Japanese perspectives, and there are substantial differences between contemporary Japanese and non-Japanese worldviews as well. However, this is not even a problem. Instead, it may be a confirmation of the constructivist point of view. As Barrett (2006b) argues, emotions lack universal biological essences and are instead constructed through cultural meaning-making. It is not necessary that people have a label for the word emotion in their language or culture — even in ancient times, people felt something, and they attempted to make sense of these experiences through their cultural frameworks. The constructivist perspective precisely argues that emotional experiences are shaped by cultural concepts available to individuals at a given time. This aligns with how ancient Japanese religious traditions developed frameworks to understand affective experiences within their specific historical and cultural contexts, similar to how Mesquita and Leu (2007) describe emotions as emerging from social and cultural practices. What makes the connection between Japanese religious traditions and constructivism particularly compelling is that they both reject essentialist views of emotions as universal mental states with fixed properties. Instead, they emphasise the contextual, relational, and culturally embedded nature of emotional experience. This parallel exists despite the vast temporal and cultural differences between these frameworks, suggesting a convergent recognition of how emotions function as cultural constructions rather than biological essentials. This perspective aligns with Uchida et al.’s (2022) Interdependence of Emotion model, which conceptualises emotions as emerging through conjoint agency between people rather than as isolated psychological events within individuals. Thus, it would be wrong to suggest that ancient Japanese people would not have recognised happiness or rage as basic emotions that all cultures recognise. The point is not that Japanese people felt happy because of the presence of musubi, but rather that their emotions were constructed within the context of musubi, or a relation. This relational understanding parallels Barrett’s (2017b) argument that emotions emerge from the interaction between physiological sensations and conceptual knowledge. Moreover, what this theory proposes is not that the Japanese traditional view is a foundational point of modern constructivism, but instead that modern constructivism is verified also in the Japanese traditional view, more than in the idea of universal emotions.

The second problem to address concerns the methodological issues. Both cross-cultural comparison and translation do present legitimate challenges. However, rather than invalidating the comparative approach, these difficulties highlight the need for careful, contextually sensitive analysis. Lindquist, MacCormack, and Shablack suggest that words for emotion categories “serve as the ‘glue’… that help bind together otherwise disparate instances of a given emotion category” (2015, p. 4). The fact that Japanese terms like musubi or mono no aware resist direct translation into Western psychological vocabulary actually supports the constructivist premise that emotional concepts are culturally specific meaning systems rather than universal natural kinds. This aligns with Wierzbicka’s (1999) observation that emotion terms across languages reflect distinctive cultural priorities and social practices, rather than universal psychological categories. The recognition of different cultural frameworks for emotion does not invalidate comparison—it enhances our understanding of the culturally shaped nature of emotional experience. This supports Barrett’s (2017a) argument that emotions are constructed experiences shaped by cultural concepts, not universal categories, with fixed properties. Japanese traditions’ independent development of frameworks for understanding emotional phenomena strengthens the constructivist case by demonstrating convergent recognition of emotions as cultural constructions rather than biological essentials. This perspective aligns with the broader constructivist view that emotions emerge through culturally specific meaning-making processes, rather than as universal natural kinds. The problem identified by Muto and Shirai (2024) regarding the lack of agreement on the definition of kanjō, according to the authors themselves, should not be resolved by forcing fixed translations of emotions in the Japanese view, but by rejecting rigid one-to-one translations.

The third problem is about the distinctiveness of epistemological approaches. The epistemological difference between Japanese religious traditions (developed through contemplation and philosophy) and constructivist theories doesn’t invalidate their comparison. Instead, it demonstrates how similar insights about emotions can emerge from diverse knowledge approaches—strengthening the case for constructivist principles. Mesquita et al. (2016) show that emotions are shaped by social relationships and cultural contexts regardless of epistemological framework. Japanese contemplative traditions complement contemporary psychology’s empirical methods, potentially enriching constructivist understandings of emotion. This convergence shows that, despite different knowledge-production methods, both approaches recognise emotions as fundamentally social and constructed experiences. These epistemological differences can be viewed as complementary rather than contradictory. Japanese religious traditions’ focus on embodied practice aligns with constructivist approaches that emphasise bodily sensations in emotional construction (Barrett, 2017a). Both frameworks recognise that emotional understanding emerges through embodied engagement with the world. This embodied aspect transcends specific epistemological approaches, suggesting a shared recognition of emotions as whole-body phenomena situated within cultural contexts (Mesquita et al., 2016). While constructivist theories have stronger lineage to Western traditions, similar insights arising independently in Japanese traditions strengthen the case for constructivist principles. This cross-cultural convergence suggests they capture fundamental aspects of emotional reality rather than culturally limited perspectives. As Uchida, Townsend, Rose Markus, and Bergsieker (2009) suggest, emotional understanding is culturally embedded, but patterns of convergence may indicate underlying commonalities in emotional meaning-making. The independent development of similar frameworks suggests that constructivist principles reflect aspects of emotional experience rather than merely Western theoretical preferences.

Conclusion

This analysis reveals that Japanese religious traditions—through concepts like musubi’s relational emergence, Buddhism’s outcome-based emotion evaluation, and Confucian socially embedded dispositions—developed frameworks that are in line with modern constructivist principles, already centuries before their formal articulation in Western psychology. Rather than positioning these traditions as precursors, this work tried to show how their independent development of emotions as relational processes validates constructivism’s core anti-essentialist position across cultures. The convergence between musubi’s spiritual interconnectedness and Uchida’s conjoint agency, or Buddhist vedanā and Barrett’s interoceptive framework, demonstrates that viewing emotions as contextually constructed biocultural phenomena, instead of universal biological givens, represents a fundamental insight that transcend time and cultures.

Despite legitimate challenges of anachronism and untranslatability, the convergences between Japanese traditional frameworks and constructivist emotion theories remain theoretically compelling. The definitional fluidity in emotion concepts such as kanjō, noted by Muto and Shirai (2024), does not invalidate cross-cultural comparison but instead supports the core constructivist argument that emotions inherently resist rigid categorisation. By examining how Shinto rituals, Buddhist mindfulness, and Confucian propriety cultivated emotion as relational practice, we can gain an understanding of how emotions emerge not from isolated brains but through culturally shaped engagement with others and our environments. This recognition—that emotion construction manifests diversely yet follows shared relational principles—ultimately may be enriching both for psychological and anthropological views on emotions.

Acknowledgment:

This researcher is supporter by the Japanese Society for Promotion of Sciences (JSPS) through a D2 scholarship. Grant Number: 24KJ0379

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Article copyright Roberto Fracchia.

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