“Peace” or National Interest? Factors Determining Japanese Citizens’ Views toward the Use of Force against Foreign States

Introduction

Japan’s security stance has been attracting a significant amount of attention in the field of international relations. During World War II, Japan aggressively pursued imperialistic policies, invading other states in Asia. However, Japan’s subsequent defeat in the war became a turning point for the country. The United States occupied Japan and completely eliminated militarism in Japanese society. While the United States continued to provide security for Japan, the Japanese government was successful in achieving high levels of economic growth in the post-World War II era. Yet, Japan’s role in the security arena has remained passive. The case of Japan challenges a traditional realist prediction, which contends that states seek to maximise their power in the international system to secure their survival (Waltz, 1993).

In accounting for Japan’s stance on national security, scholars have highlighted the importance of pacifism in Japan. Katzenstein (1996) contends Japan’s “peaceful” security culture has restrained Japan’s defense policy in the post-World War II era. Although pacifism in Japan was established decades ago, it is still largely relevant in Japanese society (Yoshida and Study Group on Military Cultures, 2024). More recently, Oros (2008, 2015) maintains that a security identity revolving around pacifist norms continues to regulate Japan’s military behaviour. Although Japanese society has widely embraced pacifismJapan has been going through drastic changes in the security arena. For example, Japan still maintains Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, but the Japanese government has been successful in gradually enhancing capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) (Lind, 2004). These efforts by the Japanese government were crystallised by the passage of the Security Bills in 2015, which allow the SDF to use force overseas under the framework of “collective self-defense” (Hughes, 2017). These pieces of legislation marked a clear break from Japan’s traditional stance in the security arena (Hughes, 2017).

One of the most important questions in this shifting security context is whether Japanese citizens are ready to support the use of force against foreign states. Berger (1998) suggests that the Japanese have embraced a “culture of antimilitarism” in the post-World War II era. Yet, this does not mean that Japanese citizens deny military options unconditionally. Noting that the stance among the Japanese population is consistent with defensive realism, Midford (2011) claims that the Japanese public is supportive of a military option to defend Japan’s territories. Machida (2014, 2018, 2020a) indicates that realist considerations significantly affect Japanese citizens’ attitudes toward military options. Similarly, research conducted by Machida (2017, 2022) reveals that factors related to nationalism and ethnocentrism can shape people’s perceptions of this matter in Japanese society. These studies have shown that individuals’ opinions regarding the use of force are not straightforward. Institutions surrounding Japan’s defense have been changing; meanwhile, we still do not fully understand Japanese citizens’ attitudes toward the use of force. It is not clear how Japanese citizens develop their opinions on this matter in a quickly changing environment.

The present research addresses the gap in the literature. More specifically, this study examines Japanese citizens’ attitudes toward the use of force by utilising the context surrounding the Security Bills in Japan. The emphasis of this study is on the issue of framing. Numerous studies have widely shown that framing can significantly influence individuals’ perceptions of various matters (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006; Schneider et al., 2016; Slothuus and De Vreese, 2010). The issue of framing is critical in the case of the Security Bills. Indeed, scholars have explored how “narrative power” shapes Japan’s model for defense issues (Gustafsson et al., 2019; Hagstrom and Gustafsson, 2019). According to Gustafsson et al. (2019), several narratives regarding Japan’s identity have affected its defense policy. The “pacifist” model, which Japan adopted in the post-World War II era, was instrumental in integrating Japan into the international community (Gustafsson et al., 2019). However, the pacifist model ceased to serve as an effective model both in domestic and international arenas; instead, other narratives that revolve around the concept of a “normal country” or a “beautiful country” emerged as models that would replace the pacifist one (Gustafsson et al., 2019). These narratives have served as important frameworks through which Japanese citizens perceive Japan’s defense policy.

Recognising the power of narratives, the main goal of this study is to examine how different frames can influence Japanese citizens’ perceptions of using military force. More specifically, the present research analyses the impact of two frames on Japanese citizens’ opinions on the issue. The first frame is the concept of “peace”, and it is important to investigate how it shapes Japanese citizens’ attitudes toward the use of force. Pacifism has been an essential component of Japanese society in the post-World War II era (Berger, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Oros, 2008, 2015). Pacifism as an ideal form began to lose its appeal among Japanese citizens in the 1960s since the issue of economic growth became more important in Japan (Hirata, 2008). Furthermore, pacifism failed to serve as an attractive political ideology in the 1970s and 1980s as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) lost its power in Japanese politics (Hirata, 2008). Although pacifism lost its momentum in Japanese society, pacifism’s values have continued to be important guiding principles for the Japanese public at a deep level. The educational system in Japan strongly emphasises the importance of peace, making “peace education” one of the essential elements of the curriculum (Hagstrom and Isaksson, 2019; Murakami, 2009, 2012, 2016). Similarly, Japan has maintained Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which symbolises the importance of peace in Japanese society (Liff and Maeda, 2018). In the same vein, the concept of peace is especially important in the field of international security. The Japanese government has been active in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN-PKO), and these missions by the SDF have been widely supported by the Japanese public (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2017). The concept of peace has further relevance when considering that it can lead to stronger support for the use of force, even if it may sound contradictory (Hagstrom and Hanssen, 2016). Abe Shinzo, Prime Minister of Japan, illustrated the connection when he advocated a “proactive contribution to peace” (sekkyokuteki heiwashugi) to justify the Security Bills in 2015 (Akimoto, 2018). One can speculate that Abe intentionally employed the concept of peace in his attempt to pass these bills (Akimoto, 2018). If the idea of peace is still appealing to Japanese citizens in the context of international security, one can hypothesise that framing the Security Bills through the notion of peace leads to strong support for the use of force among Japanese citizens. This hypothesis captures the possible impact of the peace frame on Japanese citizens’ willingness to use force.

The second frame for analysis is the concept of “national interest.” Although the Japanese widely embraced pacifism in the post-World War II era, Japan’s policy based on pacifism was harshly criticised when Japan failed to contribute to the Gulf War (George, 1993). Reacting to the criticism, some of the Japanese political elites claimed the urgent need to transform Japan into a “normal” state which is capable of using force autonomously (Ozawa, 1993; Park, 2011). This context can be helpful for understanding the Abe administration’s attempt to pass the Security Bills (Gustafsson et al., 2019). Consistent with the realist perspective in the field of international relations, one of the major goals of the “Abe Doctrine” was to bring Japan to a great power status, making Japan a leader in Asia (Dobson, 2017; Hughes, 2017; Kolmas, 2019). Recognising the importance of national interest, one can present the second hypothesis. If Japanese citizens find the idea of pursuing national interest appealing, it is possible to predict that framing the Security Bills through the concept of national interest enhances Japanese citizens’ support for the use of force.

As these two frames indicate, Japan is in an ambivalent situation in the security arena. While the concept of peace remains relevant among Japanese citizens, the Japanese government is attempting to become a “normal” state that can implement its own defense policy. Recognising the complex nature of Japan’s defense policy, this study examines how these frames can drive Japanese citizens’ support for the use of force. Does the concept of peace enhance Japanese citizens’ support for the use of force? Does the notion of national interest boost their support? The present research intends to answer these questions. In addressing them, this study tests the validity of these two hypotheses by launching an online survey among the subjects in Japan. Statistical analysis relying on the survey data supports the hypothesis focusing on the peace frame. This suggests that the notion of peace significantly boosts Japanese citizens’ willingness to use force. Unlike the peace frame, the analysis fails to detect a significant impact of the national interest frame. By closely analysing the process through which the Japanese public develops its attitudes toward defense issues, this study significantly advances our understanding of Japan’s security culture. Findings from the present research generate critical implications that are essential in understanding the current discourse surrounding the use of force in Japan.

This study proceeds as follows. The first section explains the two frames focusing on peace and national interest and theorises how these frames can shape Japanese citizens’ attitudes toward the use of force. The second section presents the research design, and the third section implements a statistical analysis. Finally, I conclude this study by summarising the main findings and discussing possible directions for future studies.

 

Peace or National Interest? Driving Forces of Japan’s Defense Policy

Japan has displayed conflicting signals in the security arena, and Japan’s security stance has been a focus of debate in the field of international relations. On the one hand, scholars have highlighted the critical importance of pacifism in understanding Japan’s defense policy (Berger, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Oros, 2008, 2015). On the other hand, others have noted that Japan is going through critical changes to become a “normal” state, one which is capable of using force autonomously (Hughes, 2017; Ozawa, 1993; Park, 2011). These postures represent the highly complex nature of Japan’s defense policy. To understand Japan’s security culture, it is important carefully to dissect these dynamics.

First, it is essential to underline the importance of pacifism in Japan in the post-World War II era. After Japan’s defeat in World War II, Japan went through a series of intense struggles through which Japan emerged as a peaceful state (Katzenstein, 1996). Consistent with this attitude, Berger (1998) suggests that Japan has established a security culture where Japanese citizens are reluctant to discuss defense issues. Although these studies analyse the origin of Japan’s security culture in the post-World War II era, these implications are still relevant in current Japanese society. Research utilising the survey data shows that Japanese citizens deeply care about the notion of peace (Yoshida and Study Group on Military Cultures, 2024). Observers note that a security identity revolving around pacifism continues to shape Japan’s views (Oros, 2008, 2015). These studies emphasise Japan’s pacifist security culture as a source of Japan’s defense policy.

One of the main arenas where the importance of pacifism manifests itself is education in Japan. The educational system in Japan has consistently emphasised the importance of peace, making peace education an essential component of school curricula (Murakami, 2009). Murakami (2012, p. 54) shows that students in Japan have displayed strong awareness toward peace. Research has indicated that learning about World War II through different channels can foster students’ desire to contribute to peace (Murakami, 2016). Machida (2020b) shows that an exposure to war memories can enhance Japanese citizens’ support for the “reassurance” policy of the SDF. [1] [i] Moreover, Hagstrom and Isaksson (2019) maintain that peace education has been instrumental in establishing a “peace identity” among Japanese students, thus forming their policy preferences in a manner consistent with pacifism. It seems that the concept of peace has been deeply ingrained among the Japanese population through peace education.

One can find similar dynamics in the issue surrounding the UN-PKO. In 1992, the debate over the International Cooperation Law was extremely intense, with many citizens expressing their concerns over Japan’s involvement in international security. Specifically, Japanese citizens were worried that dispatching the SDF overseas may open a path toward militarism (George, 1993). Despite the grave concern among the Japanese population, the public in Japan has since widely accepted the SDF’s role in the UN-PKO. Public opinion polls have indicated relatively strong support for Japan’s involvement in UN-PKO missions (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2017). It appears that Japanese citizens seem to be more tolerant when they are aware that SDF can contribute to peace in the world, thus validating the importance of peace among Japanese citizens. 

Political institutions that were built after World War II have constantly reinforced pacifism in Japan. In analysing Japan’s defense policy, it is necessary to underscore the importance of political institutions that have upheld pacifism in Japan, namely, the Japanese constitution. Following the end of World War II, Japan employed a new constitution, Article 9 of which clearly embodies pacifism in Japanese society by prohibiting Japan from acquiring military capabilities and engaging in war (The Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet). Notably, Article 9 was a byproduct of the American security strategy to prevent Japan’s emergence as a threat to the United States (Auer, 1990). Although there have been several attempts to revise Article 9, Japan still maintains it because the Japanese public has not been entirely receptive to the idea of revising the constitution (Liff and Maeda, 2018). Consequently, Article 9 has continued to shape Japan’s defense policy in the post-World War II era. [2] [ii]

Due to its symbolic importance in Japanese society, the concept of peace has been strategically utilised by politicians in Japan. The prime example for this was seen in the Abe administration, which tried to reshape the fundamental dynamics of Japan’s foreign policy. One of the main pillars of his agenda was to revise Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. However, once Abe realised it would be impossible to revise Article 9, he decided to change the interpretation of the constitution so that the Japanese government would be able to dispatch the SDF overseas under the framework of “collective self-defense” (Hughes, 2017; Saito, 2017). His agenda in the security arena was crystallised by the legislation of the Security Bills in 2015. In his attempt to pass the Security Bills, Abe tried to utilise strategically the concept of peace, which led to the adoption of the term “proactive contribution to peace” (Akimoto, 2018). The fact that Abe decided to use a term involving peace represents the critical importance of the idea in Japan’s security issues. Clearly, the concept of peace is highly appealing among Japanese citizens. Even though “proactive contribution to peace” refers to an ideology that may push Japan toward a more active role in the defense arena, this frame is attractive to Japanese citizens because of the symbolic value associated with the concept of peace. As Japan’s identity as a state goes through gradual changes, the notion of traditional pacifism tends to be outdated; instead, Japanese citizens have become more accepting of the idea of contributing to international security more actively (Gustafsson et al., 2018). Subsequently, the notion of peace could indeed open a path toward Japan’s militarisation (Hagstrom and Hanssen, 2016). Regarding this point, Hagstrom and Hanssen (2016) note, “while an identity defined in terms of a normative commitment to peace might enable cooperation and pacific relations, it might also—more unexpectedly—enable remilitarization and potentially war” (p. 284). Accordingly, one can hypothesise that framing the Security Bills in terms of peace enhances Japanese citizens’ support for the use of force.

 

Hypothesis 1: Framing the Security Bills from the perspective of peace boosts Japanese citizens’ support for the use of force.

While the concept of peace can be appealing among Japanese citizens, it is important to acknowledge the presence of another force in Japan’s defense policy: national interest. According to Matsuda (2020), Japan’s security policy is consistent with realism although its rhetoric tends to be more internationally oriented. Some claim the critical importance of transforming Japan into a “normal” state which can use force independently (Ozawa, 1993; Park, 2011). The turning point in Japan’s security policy was the Gulf War that broke out in 1989, when Japan’s inability to contribute to the military operation was harshly criticised in the international community (George, 1993). Recognising the urgent need to assume a more active role in international security, the Japanese government decided to make the necessary changes in its defense policy by passing the International Cooperation Law (George, 1993). This shift represented Tokyo’s determination to become a “normal” state that could assume more responsibility in the international community.

Based on the notion of a “normal country,” Abe Shinzo adopted the narrative of Japan as a “beautiful country” (Gustafsson et al., 2019, pp. 511-512). Both narratives claim the importance of being able to use force against foreign states by revising the Japanese constitution, but the latter highlights the uniqueness of Japan (Gustafsson et al., 2019, pp. 511-512; see also Hagstrom, 2015). Moreover, the “beautiful country” narrative emphasises Japan’s willingness to contribute to international security as an active member of the international community; accordingly, the Abe administration utilised this narrative in pursuing its security agenda (Gustafsson et al., 2019, pp. 511-512). [3][iii]  

As the security environment surrounding Japan changes, the argument for a “normal” state has become increasingly persuasive. One of the most important forces that promotes the argument for a “normal” state is heightened levels of threat in the region. For instance, North Korea has been posing a serious threat to Japan’s security. In spite of international pressure to restrain the North Korean government, Kim Jong-Un has repeatedly launched missiles toward Japan (Smith and Slodkowski, 2021). It seems to be impossible to deter North Korea’s disturbing behaviour in the region, leaving Japan vulnerable to external threats.

Along with North Korea, China poses a serious threat to Japan’s security. In recent years, the Chinese economy has continued to grow, and some predict that China will soon be the biggest economy in the world (Cheng and Lee, 2021). Backed by economic growth, China has been constantly boosting its military capabilities (Brown, 2022). The dramatic growth of China has a significant impact on the structure of the international system. In the post-Cold War world, the United States contributed to the stability of the world by establishing a “unipolar” structure of the international system (Wohlforce, 1999). Yet, some scholars warn that China will catch up with the United States and challenge American primacy, ending the unipolarity of the international system (Layne, 2012). Along with potential conflict between China and the United States, China’s dramatic growth inevitably threatens Japan’s security. Since Japan and China have territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands, observers have expressed concerns that China may use force to claim these islands (Lendon, 2022). In addition to the Senkaku Islands, Okinawa, one of the prefectures in Japan, has emerged as one of the critical issues between Japan and China. In a bid to create a new narrative over regional relations, China has tried to diffuse “misinformation” about Okinawa (Ichikawa, 2025). In the same vein, China has begun to adopt a provocative rhetoric over Okinawa, which has further escalated tension between the two states (Fackler and Notoya, 2025; McCurry, 2013; Mukai, 2023).

As Japan faces increasing levels of threat in the region, the Japanese government has been trying to address them by building up the SDF’s capabilities (Lind, 2004). Although Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibits Japan from using force, political elites in Japan seem to interpret this provision flexibly to address emerging threats in the changing environment (Lind, 2004). Reacting to North Korea’s provocation, Prime Minister Kishida explicitly discussed the possibility of striking military facilities in North Korea (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2021, October 19). The fact that Prime Minister presented this scenario reflects Japan’s pragmatic approach toward defense issues. Regarding China’s threat, the Japanese government has been continuously trying to enhance the SDF’s capabilities to defend its territories (Johnston, 2022). As these studies indicate, Japan’s strategy is not entirely consistent with pacifism (Midford, 2011). The Japanese government seems to be more flexible in countering emerging threats from its neighbouring states (Gray, 2011).

The same dynamics can be observed in the issue of nuclear weapons. Because of the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan’s stance has been consistently against nuclear weapons. Reflecting the trauma imposed by nuclear attacks, Japan has established an identity as a “non-nuclear state” (Mochizuki, 2007). Accordingly, the Japanese government employed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). Public opinion in Japan has also displayed anti-nuclear norms. Surveys have shown that the majority of Japanese citizens support the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (TV Asahi, 2006). Further reflecting this attitude, Japan has been promoting the effort toward nuclear disarmament in the international community (Akiyama and Horio, 2013; Rublee, 2009). As a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Japan demonstrates its anti-nuclear sentiment (Rublee, 2009).

While Japanese citizens display an anti-nuclear stance, it is important to look carefully into the underlying structure surrounding nuclear weapons. One can argue that Japan’s defense policy has been based on “pragmatism” rather than pacifism as an ideal form (Miller, 2018). To illustrate, the issue of the Treaty of the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is suggestive. Although the Japanese government, as the only state to have suffered from nuclear attacks, has been trying to promote the NPT, it has also expressed its opposition to the TPNW. Noting that nuclear weapons states are not part of the TPNW, the Japanese government claimed that the treaty has a structural weakness (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2020, October 27). In the same way, the Japanese government chose not to sign the TPNW due to its reliance on the US “nuclear umbrella” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2020, October 27). Since Japan finds itself in an ambivalent situation on the issue surrounding nuclear weapons, political elites in Japan have implemented contradictory policy at times (Ota, 2018). Even though the Japanese government recognises the anti-nuclear stance among the Japanese population, Tokyo has no choice but to deny the TPNW (Machida, 2023b). This strategy clearly reflects pragmatic thinking among Japanese political elites in the defense arena.

Pragmatism among political elites in Japan has led to the growing capabilities of the SDF. Although Article 9 of the Japanese constitution explicitly prohibits Japan from possessing military capabilities, the Korean War that broke out 1950 changed fundamental dynamics in East Asia. To counter the threat from communism, the United States decided to rearm Japan (Arakawa, 1997). Since then, the Japanese government has been steadily strengthening the capabilities of SDF over an extended period of time (Lind, 2004). Despite the fact that Japan still has Article 9, the SDF has been ranked as one of the most sophisticated military organisations in the world (Global Firepower, 2022; Lind, 2004).

Furthermore, the passage of the Security Bills in 2015 has fundamentally changed Japan’s stance on the use of force. Under the framework of “collective self-defense,” the SDF is now allowed to engage in combat activities overseas to counter threats against Japan (Hughes, 2017). Although the Abe administration tried to frame this motion in terms of a “proactive contribution to peace,” achieving peace in the international system is not the only goal of the Security Bills. One can argue that transforming Japan into a “normal” state was the most important goal of passing the legislation (Gustafsson et al., 2019). Indeed, Abe Shinzo, influenced by his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, pursued the goal of making Japan a leader of Asia (Hughes, 2015, p. 10). According to Hughes (2015), Abe essentially inherited this goal from Kishi and attempted to push Japan to a great power:

Abe’s ideological stance and objectives in many ways echo those of his grandfather in seeking recognition of Japan’s standing amongst the first rank, or Tier One, of capitalist powers, recovery of its autonomy as an international player, recognition as a crucial US partner and leader in Asia and confrontation of hostile authoritarian regimes in the contemporary period in the guise of China and North Korea (p. 11).

One of the goals of the Abe administration was to leave the heritages of World War II behind and achieve a strong state that can implement its defense policy autonomously (Hughes, 2015, Chapter 2). Put differently, Abe wanted to pass the Security Bills to boost Japan’s influence as a key player in the international system (Hughes, 2015, Chapter, 2). This is consistent with the realist prediction in the field of international relations: states attempt to maximise their power in the international system so that they can achieve security under anarchy (Mearsheimer, 2001). Studies have suggested that Japan’s behaviour can be effectively understood from the realist perspective. Questioning the picture of Japan as a status quo power, Hughes (2016) suggests that Japan’s foreign policy is consistent with “resentful realism.” Similarly, Ramirez (2021) contends that Abe’s foreign policy could lead to Japan’s remilitarisation, marking a clear break from its traditionally passive stance in defense policy. Furthermore, Dobson (2017) maintains that Abe’s stance was focused on defending Japan’s status in the world rather than achieving higher levels of cooperation with other states. In short, Abe’s foreign policy goal was to put behind the “post-war regime” and bring Japan to a great power status (Hughes, 2015, Chapter 2).

As the Abe administration tried to put an end to the post-war regime, observers have noted that Japanese society has been going through critical changes. Just as political elites in Japan show pragmatism in formulating Japan’s defense policy, the public in Japan displays a similar tendency. This tendency can be seen in the process surrounding Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Although Japan adopted Article 9 following the end of World War II, a large percentage of Japanese citizens supported the revision of Article 9 in 1952 (Tadokoro, 2011, pp. 47-48). It was only after the United States explicitly committed itself to Japan’s security that Japanese citizens began to support outright pacifism (Miyashita, 2007). In the same way, Machida (2014) shows that those Japanese citizens who recognise China as a military threat tend to be supportive of Japan’s nuclear armament. Similarly, Machida (2018) indicates that those Japanese citizens who do not trust the US nuclear umbrella are more likely to support the option of nuclear armament. In other words, the Japanese have never been true pacifists; rather, they have been more pragmatic in security issues (Miyashita, 2007). Along with this tendency, Midford (2011) suggests that Japanese citizens widely support the use of force to defend their territories, claiming that Japanese citizens’ attitudes are consistent with defensive realism. Machida (2020a) demonstrates that realist factors tend to determine Japanese citizens’ behaviour in the security arena. Reflecting these tendencies, the Japanese public is gradually changing its attitudes toward Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. According to the recent poll, the majority of Japanese citizens are supportive of revising the Japanese constitution, although they are still against the idea of going to war (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2025). In a changing security environment in the region, Japanese citizens are adjusting their attitudes toward defense issues (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2025). As these cases indicate, the Japanese display elements of pragmatism in defense issues rather than being pure pacifists.

In recent years, Japanese society has been going through gradual changes, and these changes can potentially reinforce the Japanese government’s attempt to transform Japan into a “normal” state. Since eight decades have passed since the end of World War II, it may be inevitable that Japanese citizens are gradually shifting their attitudes toward defense issues. Sasada (2006) suggests that younger generations in Japan have become more comfortable with explicitly discussing defense issues. Similarly, observers contend that Japanese citizens exhibit xenophobic tendencies more explicitly (Park, 2017). Specifically, political conflict between Japan and its neighbouring states fuels hostility toward China and South Korea among the Japanese population (Asahi Shimbun, 2019). Online content about these countries often goes viral with a number of hostile comments directed toward them (Tsuji and Fujita, 2011). These issues have caused an intense controversy in Japanese society involving various actors (Japan Times, 2014, July 26; Merklejn and Wislicki, 2020).

These changing dynamics can establish a soil where the Japanese government can take a more aggressive approach in foreign policy, and the case of the Senkaku Islands is suggestive. When the Governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarō, expressed his intention to purchase the Senkaku Islands in 2011, the political climate in Japan took a highly nationalistic turn, serving as a powerful force urging the Japanese government to nationalise the islands (Horiuchi, 2014). As this case represents, strong nationalism among Japanese citizens can drive Japan’s defense policy, making it easier for the Japanese government to take a more aggressive stance against foreign states. Indeed, studies conducted at the individual level verify this point. Relying on survey data in Japan, Machida (2017) shows that nationalism among Japanese citizens leads to stronger support for the use of force against China. Similarly, Machida (2022) indicates that ethnocentric tendencies can boost Japanese citizens’ willingness to embrace the option of nuclear armament. As these studies suggest, gradual changes in Japanese society can have critical implications for Japan’s foreign policy. Since main obstacles toward becoming a “normal” state can be found in the domestic arena, these changes allow political elites in Japan to implement policy consistent with a realist perspective. The result can reinforce dynamics that move the country toward being a “normal” state capable of using force against foreign states more independently. Accordingly, one can hypothesise that framing the Security Bills in terms of national interest boosts Japanese citizens’ support for the use of force.

Hypothesis 2: Framing the Security Bills from the perspective of national interest boosts Japanese citizens’ support for the use of force.

As shown above, it is possible to frame the Security Bills from these two perspectives. It is important to explore how these two frames can shape Japanese citizens’ perceptions of a military option. The next section explains the research design that makes it possible to test these two hypotheses.

 

Research Design

To test the hypotheses above, this study conducts a survey experiment in Japan. In recent years, the survey experiment method has become increasingly popular in different disciplines, generating numerous studies relying on this method. One of the advantages of a survey experiment is that researchers can test causality by randomly assigning stimuli to respondents in different groups. A survey experiment makes it possible to draw a valid causal inference. In implementing a survey experiment, it is necessary to collect enough samples. For this purpose, I relied on a crowdsourcing service in Japan. I recruited responses through a website hosted by Crowdworks, which is one of the most popular crowdsourcing companies in Japan. [4] [iv] There were two criteria to be eligible for the survey: (1) respondents had to be at least 19 years old, and (2) they had to reside in Japan at the time of the survey. All the survey questions were posed in Japanese. The survey was conducted in January 2021 with the survey platform Qualtrics, which has been widely used in various disciplines. [5][v]

By utilising the crowdsourcing service, I was able to recruit a total of 427 respondents. 38.39% of the respondents were male, and 61.14% were female. The age distribution of the respondents was as follows: 20-30 years old (17.06%), 31-40 years old (35.07%), 41-50 years old (31.04%), 51-60 years old (13.98%), and 61 years or older (2.6%). Regarding educational attainments, 51.4% of respondents had a bachelor’s degree or higher. While the use of online surveys has become extremely popular in different disciplines, one of the main concerns of online surveys is the representativeness of the samples (De Leeuw, 2012). Yet, this should not critically undermine the external validity of this study. Even though the samples are not representative of the Japanese population, the main goal of this study is to examine the impact of different framings on Japanese citizens’ perceptions of the use of force. As long as the survey experiment detects a link between frames and respondents’ opinions of the matter, the composition of the samples should not undermine the effectiveness of the statistical analysis. Furthermore, studies indicate that statistical analyses relying on population-based surveys and those employing online surveys generally produce similar results (Coppock, 2019; Coppock et al., 2018). Therefore, it is highly unlikely that survey experiments utilising online surveys critically undermine the external validity (Coppock, 2019; Coppock et al., 2018). Considering these points, it is beneficial to conduct survey experiments relying on samples obtained from online surveys.

In testing the hypotheses, it is necessary to isolate the impact of each frame. Since this study examines the impact of two different frames, I divided the respondents into three groups: a control group, Treatment Group 1 (peace frame), and Treatment Group 2 (national interest frame). Since Qualtrics has a function of random assignment, I exposed respondents in each group to different frames. For respondents in the control group, I presented the following basic scenario:

In recent years, some of the policymakers in Japan have been talking about transforming Japan into a country that is more autonomous in security issues. These discussions were crystallised in the passage of the Security Bills in 2015.

For respondents in the Treatment Group 1 (peace frame), I showed the basic scenario above. In addition to this, respondents in this group were asked to read the scenario below:

Experts have emphasised that Japan should be able to use force against foreign states, so that Japan can contribute to world peace. They claim that the Security Bills would allow Japan to pursue the goal of promoting peace around the world. [6] [vi]

Respondents in Treatment Group 2 (national interest frame) were shown the same scenario as the one in the control group. Following the general description of the Security Bills, they were asked to read the following scenario:

Experts have emphasised that Japan would be able to advance its national interest if Japan can use force more freely. They claim that the Security Bills would allow Japan to further gain political influence in the international community. [7] [vii]

After respondents in each group were exposed to their assigned story, I asked them the following question:

• If it is necessary, Japan should use force overseas.

For this statement, respondents were asked to choose one of the following items: “Strongly agree,” “Somewhat agree,” “Somewhat disagree,” and “Strongly disagree.” [8] [viii] I have recoded these responses so that higher numbers indicate stronger support for the use of force. If these frames differently affect Japanese citizens’ perceptions of the use of force, one should be able to observe a statistically significant difference among these groups in levels of support for a military option.

Empirical Analysis

To test the hypotheses above, it is important to implement a statistical analysis. For this purpose, I conducted a t-test, which makes it possible to compare means across two groups. [9] [ix] First, I examined how the peace frame affects respondents’ opinions of using force. To allow for a comparison between the control group and Treatment Group 1 (peace frame), I removed observations that were in Treatment Group 2 (national interest frame). Table 1 displays the result of the t-test between the control group and Treatment Group 1 (peace frame).

Table 1: T-test for Support for the Use of Force I (Peace Framing)

The table shows two different means across these two groups. The mean for the control group is 2.09 while the mean for Treatment Group 1 (peace frame) is 2.40. The t-test indicates the difference between these two means is significant (two-tailed, p<0.01), suggesting that respondents in Treatment Group 1 (peace frame) are more likely to support the use of force against foreign states. One can speculate that the reference to peace significantly boosts respondents’ inclination to support the use of force. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1 above.

Figure 1 Peace Frame and Support for the Use of Force

In addition to a t-test, it is important to visualize the impact of the peace frame. Figure 1 shows the means of two groups with 95% confidence intervals. As the figure indicates, the mean value of Treatment Group 1 (peace frame) is significantly higher than that of the control group. Those respondents who are exposed to the peace frame are more likely to support a military option. Accordingly, implications from this figure are consistent with Hypothesis 1.

Table 2: T-test for Support for the Use of Force (National Interest Frame)

Second, it is necessary to examine how the national interest frame affects respondents’ attitudes toward the use of force. I conducted a second t-test using responses from the control group and Treatment Group 2 (national interest frame). For this analysis, I removed observations that were in Treatment Group 1 (peace frame). Table 2 displays the result of the t-test comparing means of the control group and Treatment Group 2 (national interest frame). In the table, the mean of the control group is 2.09 while the mean of Treatment Group 2 (national interest frame) is 2.10. While the mean value for Treatment Group 2 (national interest frame) is slightly higher, the result of the t-test is not statistically significant (two-tailed, p=0.95). One cannot observe a statistically significant difference between these two groups. The scenario focusing on Japan’s national interest does not seem to enhance Japanese citizens’ support for the use of force.

Figure 2 National Interest Frame and Support for the Use of Force

Figure 2 indicates the mean values of these two groups with 95% confidence intervals. As the figure shows, the means of each group are nearly identical. The scenario based on the national interest frame does not affect respondents’ views toward a military option. Hence, one can conclude that the national interest frame does not affect respondents’ opinions of using force. As a result, it is possible to reject Hypothesis 2.  

In addition to these findings from t-tests, it is important to examine the impact of each frame through a multivariate analysis. There is a possibility that the significant effect of the peace frame may disappear once other factors are considered. For this purpose, I conducted a statistical analysis incorporating a series of potentially confounding factors. First, it is important to control for respondents’ educational attainment. In the context of Japan, “peace education” plays an important role in shaping the pacifist identity among the Japanese public (Hagstrom and Isaksson, 2019; Murakami, 2009, 2012, 2016). It is likely that education is significantly related to individuals’ attitudes toward the use of force. Second, the analysis examines respondents’ gender. Research indicates that males tend to be more supportive of using force toward foreign states (Eichenberg, 2003). Accordingly, one can predict that male respondents are more likely to embrace an option of using force. Third, this study considers respondents’ age. Studies indicate that younger generations in Japan are less reluctant to talk about defense issues (Sasada, 2006). Therefore, it is possible to hypothesise that younger respondents are more supportive of using force against foreign states. Finally, the analysis controls for threat perceptions among the subjects. More specifically, I consider the following three kinds of threat: (1) threat from North Korea, (2) economic threat from China, and (3) military threat from China (Machida, 2014, 2020a, 2023c). Studies have indicated that perceptions of China as a military threat induce Japanese citizens’ stronger support for the use of force (Machida 2014, 2017, 2020a). Therefore, one can expect that higher levels of threat perceptions boost individuals’ support for the use of force. The multivariate analysis incorporates these factors above. Since the dependent variable of this study is ordinal, I conduct an ordered probit analysis. To be consistent with t-tests above, I use the same observations (the control group and Treatment Group 1) for the analysis of the peace frame. Similarly, in the analysis of the national interest frame, this study relies on the same observations (the control group and Treatment Group 2). Table 3 displays the result of the ordered probit analysis.

Table 3: Ordered Probit Analysis on Japanese Citizens’ Attitudes toward Use of Force

Model 1 is the analysis focusing on the peace frame. As the table shows, perceptions of China as a military threat show a statistically significant impact on the dependent variable (p<0.001). Its positive coefficient suggests that perceived threat from the Chinese military boosts respondents’ support for the use of force. Unlike this variable, other control variables fail to show a statistically significant effect. The most important variable in this model is the peace frame, which is the presence of the stimulus in the experiment. The analysis detects a significant effect of the peace frame (p<0.01). The direction of the coefficient is positive, meaning that those respondents who are exposed to the peace frame are more likely to embrace the option of using force. This result is consistent with the hypothesis above, verifying a significant impact of the peace frame. Model 2 is the analysis focusing on the national interest frame. As in the case of Model 1, the variable capturing military threat from China shows a statistically significant effect (p<0.001). Yet, this is the only variable that indicates a significant impact in Model 2. The national interest frame does not seem to be an important factor shaping individuals’ opinions among respondents. The overall analysis verifies the critical importance of the peace frame in establishing respondents’ attitudes toward the use of force; those who are exposed to the peace frame are more likely to support the option involving the use of force.

As we have seen above, the survey experiment compared the impact of two different frames. While one can observe a significant effect of the peace frame, the analysis does not show a statistically significant effect of the national interest frame. These results suggest that Japanese citizens are more sensitive to the concept of peace in considering the issue of using force against foreign states. However, the reference to national interest does not seem to affect Japanese citizens’ views toward a military option. These findings may represent the unique nature of Japan’s security culture.

Conclusion

Japan has long maintained its passive stance in the security arena in the post-World War II era. However, Japan’s security policy is not static. In recent years, Japan’s defense policy has been going through critical changes. The passage of the Security Bills in 2015 marked a clear break from Japan’s passive stance in the security arena, making it possible for the SDF to engage in combat activities overseas (Hughes, 2017; Ramirez, 2021). Recognising the drastic changes in Japan’s defense policy, the goal of the present research has been to examine how Japanese citizens perceive the issue of using force in a quickly changing environment.

The emphasis of this study is on the effect of framing. More specifically, the present research has tested the impact of two frames. First, I have examined how the frame of peace shapes Japanese citizens’ perceptions of using force. The concept of peace has played a critical role in guiding Japan’s security policy in the post-World War II era (Berger, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Oros, 2008, 2015; Yoshida and Study Group on Military Cultures, 2024). Consistent with this perspective, peace education has been an essential component of the curriculum in Japanese schools (Murakami, 2009; Hagstrom and Isaksson, 2019). Highlighting the importance of peace, the Abe administration proposed the notion of a “proactive contribution to peace” in its attempt to pass the Security Bills (Akimoto, 2018). If Japanese citizens widely recognise the importance of peace, the scenario underscoring Japan’s contribution to international security should significantly shape Japanese citizens’ views toward the use of force. Accordingly, one could hypothesise that a reference to peace in the world will significantly boost Japanese citizens’ support for a military option.

Second, I have explored how a frame that revolves around national interest shapes Japanese citizens’ attitudes toward the use of force. The security environment surrounding Japan has been quickly changing with China and North Korea posing serious threats to Japan. As other states in the region threaten Japan, the Abe administration tried to transform Japan into a “normal” state which can use force independently (Ozawa, 1993; Park, 2011). Abe envisioned Japan as a key player in the international system (Hughes, 2015), and his goal was consistent with the realist perspective, which contends that states try to maximise their power in the international system (Dobson, 2017; Ramirez, 2021). Abe’s attempt to pass the Security Bills could be understood through this framework. Given the appeal of Abe’s goal to achieve a great power status in the world among the Japanese population, one may hypothesise that the scenario underlining Japan’s national interest will boost individuals’ support for the use of force.

To test these two hypotheses, I conducted a survey experiment utilising data obtained in Japan. The results of the statistical analysis support the first hypothesis, showing that the peace frame significantly enhances respondents’ support for the use of force. Respondents are more willing to embrace a military option if they know that this policy contributes to peace in the world. While the analysis has verified the significant impact of the peace frame, it has not supported the second hypothesis. The survey experiment failed to detect evidence indicating a significant effect of the national interest frame. Thus, the statistical analysis generated contrasting findings regarding the impact of two frames on respondents’ views toward the use of force.

These findings provide critical implications in understanding Japan’s security culture. In recent years, the Japanese government has implemented drastic changes in its defense policy as represented by the passage of the Security Bills. Accordingly, it seems clear that Japan’s security culture has also gone through transformation along with institutional changes that took place in Japan (Gustafsson et al., 2018; Hughes, 2017). When Japanese citizens incorporate the concept of peace in their decision-making system, they are more likely to support the use of force. As Hagstrom and Hanssen (2016) argue, it is indeed true that the notion of peace leads to stronger support for a military option in the security arena. Unlike the peace frame, the notion of national interest did not activate stronger support for the use of force among respondents. While the Abe administration tried to achieve a great power status in the international system, this perspective is not crucial in determining individuals’ attitudes toward the use of force. It is the concept of peace, rather than national interest, that significantly determines Japanese citizens’ attitudes toward the use of force against foreign states.

The continuous importance of peace as an idea in Japan is highly remarkable. Although a high percentage of Japanese citizens rejected outright pacifism as an ideal form in the 1960s (Hirata, 2008), the concept of peace is still relevant in determining individuals’ support for the use of force. As scholars have widely documented, the meaning of peace is gradually changing in Japanese society (Gustafsson et al., 2018; Hagstrom and Hanssen, 2016). It is important systematically to analyse how the changing meaning of peace influences Japanese citizens’ opinions in defense issues, and future studies need to address this matter.

Notes

[i] Similarly, Machida (2023a) indicates that those individuals who are deeply immersed in war memories are more likely to discuss security issues. Regarding the “reassurance” policy, see Midford (2010).

[ii] Yet, the Japanese public is gradually shifting its attitudes toward Article 9. In the poll conducted in 2025, the majority of the respondents support the idea of revising the Japanese constitution, although 75% of the respondents are against the idea of engaging in war, which is one of the core elements of Article 9 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2025).

[iii] The “normal country” narrative and the “beautiful country” narrative share the core idea, highlighting the importance of being able to use force autonomously. In this study, I choose to focus on the “normal country’ narrative since this perspective highlights national interest rather than being able to contribute to international security (Gustafsson et al., 2019, pp. 511-512). The “normal country” narrative better serves the purpose of the present study, which is to test how Japanese citizens react to the scenario underlining Japan’s national interest.

[iv] Crowdworks is one of the most popular crowdsourcing services in Japan: https://crowdworks.jp/

[v] This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (approval no: 120123-1). The data are available from the author upon request.

[vi] This frame is consistent with the idea of a “proactive contribution to peace” advocated by the Abe administration (Akimoto, 2018). Few studies have systematically examined Japanese citizens’ attitudes toward the Security Bills. Yet, Machida (2023a) analyses Japanese citizens’ opinions of the Security Bills in relations with war memories.

[vii] This frame was created based on various figures who claimed the importance of establishing a “normal” state (Hughes, 2015, p. 11; Ozawa, 1993; Park, 2011).

[viii] The choice of “Don’t know/ refuse to answer” was also available. This choice was coded as a missing value. I applied this rule to all of the survey questions.

[ix] Before I conducted the t-test, I dropped observations that did not pass manipulation checks for the Treatment Group 1 (peace frame) and the Treatment Group 2 (national interest frame).

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Article copyright Satoshi Machida.

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