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electronic journal of contemporary japanese
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Discussion Paper 1 in 2005
First published in ejcjs on
31 January 2005
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Municipal Mergers in
Rural Japan
Easy on the Powerful,
Severe on the Weak1
by
Anthony Rausch
e-mail the Author
Introduction
The 1 January 2004 the Aomori-prefectural-wide
Tōōnippō Newspaper included a two-page article titled
‘Municipal Mergers — The Countdown as the Region Seeks its Future Form.’2
Pointing out that there was just slightly over one year left until the term
for the Special Law for Municipal Mergers closes in March 2005, the article
reported on a ‘fever pitch’ of activity undertaken by the Municipal Merger
Councils—in forms both as voluntary and legal councils—which had been
organized throughout the cities, towns, and villages of Aomori Prefecture.
As of this point, inconsistency reigned, as some councils meandered through
a trial and error process of gathering information and considering options,
while others, having preliminarily determined merger partners and merger
dates and established new names, had dissolved themselves, with a few
municipalities refusing the merger concept altogether.
This paper presents an examination of
gappei, or municipal merger, as the process of what are being dubbed the
Heisei mergers unfolds in rural Japan over a three year-plus period leading
up to the deadline of March 20053.
The paper opens by contextualizing the broad arguments for municipal mergers
as well as the prevailing reality and results of municipal mergers,
describing various merger scenarios and outcomes in other settings, before
presenting a brief history of such mergers in Japan and the ongoing case for
Aomori Prefecture, the northernmost prefecture of Honshu. As the Heisei
mergers are still unfolding, both throughout Japan as a whole and in Aomori,
the paper is neither complete nor conclusive. Indeed, as the background
literature which will contextualize the specific case presented herein
affirms, while the preparation and processes of mergers end with official
declarations and the like, the outcomes, be they success or failure, of
municipal mergers take years, if not decades, to fully emerge.
Municipal Mergers: Promise versus Reality
Sancton (2003) points out that municipal
amalgamation is the exception rather than the contemporary trend, noting
that since 1990, amalgamations in the west, outside of Canada, have occurred
only in New Zealand, two Australian states, a very few local authorities in
England and post-apartheid South Africa, with municipal secession the
prevailing trend in the United States. The basic premise behind the drive
for municipal mergers is cost savings through economies of scale and
simplification of government bureaucracies and services. Carey, Srinivasan
and Strauss (1996) note that while merger plans can be drawn up with ease to
achieve such goals, the fundamental tensions are ultimately between such
plans, wherever and however they emerge, and the specificity of local needs
and interests together with the political acceptability of addressing, to
whatever degree of success is possible, those needs and interests with
mergers. Sancton concurs, noting that in the Canadian case, recent municipal
amalgamations can only be explained by a state-centered account of policy
making, in which provincial leaders sponsored amalgamations even though
there was little or no societal demand for such policy and there existed
multiple other courses of action.
Examining the specific objectives of
mergers, Carey, Srinivasan and Strauss outlined a mathematically derived and
proven optimal scheme for the consolidation of municipalities which focuses
on common sense, minimum change and what is feasible as the optimal planning
factors to bring about the highest level of achievement identified as the
objective. They conclude that there is an optimal case for merging, the
elements of which are usually distinct from existing reality and most-often
applied schemes. They outline what they call an Optimal Scheme, derived on
the basis of both economic and social service variables, which provided
lower costs and satisfied socio-economic feasibility constraints much better
than the commonly-employed School District Scheme or the Council of
Government Scheme (in a study conducted in the USA). In addition, the
districts identified on the basis of their Optimal Scheme turned out to have
strong parallels with the districts formed under the other schemes, an
important aspect under the minimum change requirement. The conclusion of the
research is that the less than ideal results (if not outright failure) of
municipal consolidation that did occur in the US is often a consequence of
neglecting to satisfy the specific socio-economic constraints of specific
places.
Close examination of the merger trend in
Canada presents a likewise cautionary perspective. Vojnovic (2000) found
that the success or failure of municipal consolidation in a case study in
Canada, which in his terms was directed toward modifying the highly complex
reorganization of the intricate structure of administration and politics,
was dependent on the particular circumstances of the municipalities
themselves, related to their distinct history as well as spatial and
economic conditions. In another case study examining the thirty-five year
process of government-led municipal reform in Ottawa City (Canada), Graham,
Maslove and Phillips (2001) point out that the rationalization of government
costs itself can not accommodate the needs for citizen-centered government
and the sense of community on the one hand as well as the necessity for
government influence on economic structures on the other. Based on their
examination, they outline the restructuring as having progressed through
three stages. The first they labelled a ‘search for technocratic elegance
and moderation in all things,’ in which a major tension arose as the notion
that ‘bigger is better’ was tempered by a fragile unity and a geographic
split between urban and suburban-rural. The second stage saw ascendant
regionalism within the region countered by tensions on a vertical
administrative line, between upper-tier councils and lower-tier mayors and
administrators. The third stage brought a transfer of political power,
resulting in what the authors refer to as a ‘common sense revolution’
focusing attention on a search for simple solutions. The authors stress that
while some elements remained the same, the original reasons for reform as
well as the processes and solutions offered changed dramatically over the
thirty-plus year period. The early motivations, namely long-term financial
stability and comprehensive regional land-use planning, gave way over the
course of the transition to a short-term and clearly ideological
justification: less government was seen as better and cheaper. The two-tier
regional government model that was to accommodate both local identities and
regional service provision in the early period was deemed too cumbersome
(read expensive) and gave way ultimately to a one-tier, one-city government.
They note several contentious issues which emerged through the process, as
follows:
- Upward cost pressures: despite assurances
that amalgamation would generate cost savings, restructuring brought
upward pressure on costs, especially during the transition period itself.
- Completion within mandate period: due to
the difficulty of the task and the necessity for broad recognition of the
legitimacy of the new municipal form, it was difficult to assess whether
the reform was fully completed with the close of the mandate period.
- Restraining municipal functions: given
the need for ongoing service provision, it was difficult if not impossible
to put existing municipal operations on hold during a transition period.
- Human resources issues: with such
restructuring, issues for municipal workers such as seniority rights,
harmonization of wages, and restructuring of work have proven difficult to
fully address.
- Neighborhood-level citizen engagement:
questions remain regarding how to best encourage citizen engagement at the
local neighborhood level.
Municipal Mergers in Japan: Past and
Present
Mergers are not solely a phenomenon of the
west, nor of contemporary Japan. As Nakanishi (2002) points out, there have
been two significant periods of mergers in Japan’s modern history. The first
occurred over the period from 1888 to 1889, when the 71,314 identified
‘natural settlements’ (shizen shuraku) were amalgamated into 15,859
cities, towns and villages, justified under the reasoning of increasing the
scale and relevance of the resulting respective autonomous governing bodies.
The second major merger period occurred over the period from 1953 to 1956,
when the 9,868 cities, towns and villages were merged to yield 4,668
municipalities. Undertaken for purposes of the establishment of a National
Treasury Subsidy System, most notable in this merger period was the
disappearance of over 5,000 villages and the near-doubling of the number of
cities.
The current merger trend in Japan is legally
based on decisions taken at the national government level. As outlined in a
Municipal Merger Assistance Plan (Summary) dated August 30, 2001 (Municipal
Merger Assistance Headquarters), the Government strongly promotes voluntary
merger of municipalities ‘in order to maintain and improve the
administrative services of the municipalities, which are the fundamental
local public offices’ (online document). The mergers are to be accomplished
by March 2005, when the Laws on Special Cases of Municipal Mergers expires,
in accordance with the Comprehensive Program for Administrative Reform
(Cabinet Decision of December 1, 2000). The Assistance Plan includes
measures aimed at the expansion of local administrative and fiscal measures,
and measures based on cooperation by related ministries. The former outlines
upgrading and expanding a local initiative system regarding merger
conferences and introduction of a local referendum system, as well as better
utilization of former municipalities and local councils and increased
flexibility in the designation of an ordinance-designated city. The fiscal
component seeks to address the tax system, provide subsidies for promoting
municipal mergers, and fiscal measures for merger assistance programs and
public corporations. The Assistance Plan measures based on related ministry
cooperation are categorized in the following six areas:
- Social Infrastructure that supports a
Comfortable Life
- An Abundant Living Environment
- Health and Medical Care and Welfare
Throughout Life
- Education that will Cultivate
Capabilities of the Next Generation
- Industry Appropriate for the New Century
- Town Development by Cooperation and
Exchange.
Also alluded to in the Assistance Plan are
specific measures for coordination and cooperation in publicity activities
for municipal mergers and a post-merger advisory system.
The process of municipal mergers, as
outlined by Nakanishi (2002; see also Ikegami 2003) consists of two major
stages, each of which include multiple internal steps. The first stage
consists of interested cities, towns and villages forming voluntary
assemblies, which initiate investigations and study of mergers. Closing out
this first stage the assemblies undertake decisions based in legal statutes,
the final of which is the decision to merge. The second stage, consisting of
the application and official formation stage, includes the presentation of
an official application, the decision of the prefectural governor accepting
the application and the emergence of the merged municipality.
A Japan Research Institute News Release
dated September 25, 2001 reports on a survey concerning the state of
progress in implementing municipal mergers. Quite understandably, at that
time, the majority were most interested in ‘information gathering,’ focusing
mostly on information on precedent mergers and trends among other councils
and study groups. The most important issue identified at that point was
negotiation with other cities, towns, or villages involved with the merger.
The survey found that few councils or study groups were at that time
actively trying to involve local residents, with just a fraction considering
holding referendums on the issue. Tieing incentives to the merger expiry
date was seen by the national government as important in promoting municipal
consolidation; however many councils and study groups reported needing local
leadership and specific advise in actually developing mergers, rather than
incentives to promote them.
The Case for Aomori Prefecture
Aomori Prefecture, the northern-most
prefecture on Honshu Island, has approximately 1,470,000 residents spread
over three major cities, an additional four large cities, as well as 59
towns and villages (2003 Kensei Data Book, edited by Yano Tsuneta
Kinenkai). Aomori City, the prefectural capital, has a population of just
under 300,000, followed by Hachinohe City with just over 240,000 and
Hirosaki City with just under 180,000 residents. The prefecture is highly
dependent on agriculture, with one of the highest primary sector workforces
in Japan, and ranks low on most economic and social lifestyle indices. The
prefecture is comprised of three distinct, but unmarked districts: the
Tsugaru on the western, Sea of Japan side; the Nambu on the eastern, Pacific
coast side; and the ax-shaped peninsula that is Shimokita also on the east
side. These three districts are a function of a combination of cultural
history and regional geography, the result being areas with distinct and
powerful dialects, characteristic and unique local practices and commodities
and a clear sense of independence. Each of these three districts is centered
on a major city: Hirosaki is the heart of the Tsugaru District, Hachinohe
the core city of the Nambu and Mutsu, population just under 50,000, the
center of Shimokita.
Hirosaki City Merger PR
An explanation packet produced by Hirosaki
City in the fall of 2002 explains that municipal mergers involve the joining
of several cities, towns and villages, primarily to strengthen their public
finance base. Two forms are explained, one being the ‘new establishment
merger,’ when ‘A town joins with B village to become C town,’ and the second
the ‘incorporation merger,’ when ‘E town (as well as F and G towns) simply join(s)
D city.’
The necessity for municipal mergers,
according to the Hirosaki City information packet, include the increasing
welfare delivery needs of the aging population, the reality of a widening
lifestyle pattern, the support of national decentralization and the severity
of the public finance situation. Municipal mergers are broadly (and
optimistically) cast as benefiting the area in three areas:
- Strengthening regional and municipal
revitalization, specifically infrastructural improvements in roads and
land use, efforts regarding local issues such as environmental protection
and tourism promotion, and providing for economic revitalization together
with recognition of the region’s unique character.
- Maintaining and improving resident
services, specifically providing for youth education, library and sport
facilities, municipal planning, and social welfare and other specialized
service provision.
- Strengthening and rationalizing public
finance, specifically in areas of organizational and planning oversight,
third-sector projects, and public administration of local public, cultural
and sports facilities.
Citizen concerns that are alluded to in the
packet include:
- The distance factor, specifically that
increasing the distance between resident and municipal office will lower
service.
- The loss of neighborhood identity and a
consciousness of local life.
- The question of how municipal mergers
will affect taxes.
- The merits of mergers with respect to
depopulation.
- The potential for the loss of regional
traditions and culture.
The overall process of municipal mergers is
outlined in a three-stage progression from ‘Merger Potential’ to ‘Council
Formation’ to ‘Formal Petition for Merger’ and ‘Merger Completion.’ The
first stage includes activation of discussion within the region and the
relevant municipal bodies undertaking surveys and study regarding the need
and will for merging. The second stage begins with establishment of a
Voluntary Merger Council (nin’i no gappei kyogikai), which is
followed by the establishment of a Legal Merger Council (hotei no gappei
kyogikai) with the authority to undertake the planning of a new
municipality. The Legal Merger Council has the right to determine whether to
go forward with a merger, to determine the form of the merger (new
establishment or incorporation merger), assign a new name to the merged
municipality, and undertake overall planning for the merged municipality. In
the third stage, a petition to the Prefectural Council is lodged, after
which the new municipality is declared.
The Issues for Hachinohe City
The 1 January 2004 Tōōnippō article
portrayed the case for Hachinohe City at that time. With the proposed merger
including seven surrounding towns and villages, the size of Hachinohe will
increase 3.7 fold, gaining approximately 800 square kilometers and 56,000
residents, to a total population of just under 300,000. The article
identified the following six areas of concern.
Leadership - Given that seven
municipalities—the surrounding towns and villages that will merge with
Hachinohe—will essentially cease to exist, the seven mayors of these
surrounding municipalities will lose their seats. However, in order to
ensure understanding of the specifics of each area and maintain effective
communication with residents in those areas, the Hachinohe mayor has
proposed establishing a special employment category for the possibly
soon-to-be ex-mayors.
City Office - That city offices are
charged with providing essential services to citizens is obvious; however,
under the merger, debate will emerge about what constitutes ‘essential
services.’ Hachinohe will obviously assume primary responsibilities related
to work, school and commerce, with the offices of the seven merged
municipalities serving as branch offices. The question that has arisen is,
given the specifics of such branch services, to what degree can the overall
structure be centralized. Further, although the Hachinohe mayor maintains
that services should be close and direct to residents, budgetary
considerations in areas of agricultural policy and tourism promotion will
necessitate centralization.
Municipal Councils - Given that
special provisions are being drawn to allow for the inclusion of all
municipal council members of the seven municipalities, the resulting total
number of council members will reach one-hundred and forty-six, yielding
what is being called a ‘mammoth council.’ Given the post merger population,
the legally-identified limit for council members for regional autonomous
legal bodies is thirty-eight. With local elections not scheduled until 2007,
discussion regarding provision of a meeting place and council member
remuneration are ongoing.
Residence - While addresses will not
change for those living in Hachinohe City itself, addresses for the
surrounding merged municipalities will inevitably change. Even while
minimizing the nature of the change, this will clearly bring the reality of
the merger to local residents. One simple step will be to remove the ‘ōaza’
(major section of a village) reference to a village section while keeping
the ‘cho’ and ‘mura’ name. However, it is also noted that it may be
counterproductive to allow association with the old village to linger during
the period of transition to a new city.
Taxes - Except for resident and fixed asset taxes, the circumstances
of taxes post-merger has been for the most part decided. With uniformity
brought to the tax rates over a five-year post-merger period, it appears
that an increase in tax burden will be felt by a small number. At present,
resident tax rates are fairly equal throughout the area when adjusted for
respective incomes. However, with the uniformity brought by the merger, the
burden on residents of smaller towns and villages is expected to rise, in
some cases by as much as a quarter of the present tax. Corporate residence
tax and tax on fixed assets is predicted to rise by a factor of
approximately 1.2 as well.
Childcare - There is a clear need to address the present low birth
rate of the area, particularly with the increasing number of mothers who are
working. In the municipalities surrounding Hachinohe City, there are 81
public and private childcare facilities, with fees levied on the basis of an
income scale. However, while the Hachinohe City scale includes eight tiers,
the nearby Fukuchi Village has just five. The post-merger scale has been set
to nine tiers, meaning that in most cases, the use fee will decrease, and
with it the annual revenues and operating budgets for the childcare
facilities. In addition, there are calls for more uniform rules regarding
facilities offering extended hours and post-hospitalization facilities
applicable across the post-merger district.
An Analysis of Mergers in Japan:
Government, Municipality and Resident
Looking at municipal mergers from a sector
analysis approach, with the sectors being first, the central government,
second, the cities, towns and villages themselves, and third, the residents
of those cities, towns, and villages, Hagiwara (2004) comes to a rather
sobering assessment.
Taking first the central government
perspective, mergers seem to be an all-win scenario. Given the severity of
the current circumstances of public finance in Japan, mergers will, as
advertised, undoubtedly reduce national government expenditures over the
long term—even if they achieve little reduction in the short term. The
reasoning that supports this scenario is that although there will be a need
for support during and directly after the merger period, with the number of
municipalities reduced and the services they provide consolidated, the
necessity of overall tax transfers will be reduced over the long term. From
the perspective of the cities, towns, and villages, the picture becomes more
complicated. Of course, municipalities are investigating the potential
advantages of mergers, particularly given the local fiscal crisis many of
them are also experiencing. The promise of a finance influx during the
merger period and in the short term thereafter, together with the potential
penalty to be incurred in reduction of long term tax money flowing in their
direction by not merging, is proving irresistible to many municipalities.
However, there is a very important ‘fact of life’ that accompanies mergers
which may haunt the smaller municipalities which merge.
Despite the best intentions of mergers,
broad regional inequality will undoubtedly emerge and grow, as the central
and presumably larger municipality, by virtue of centripetal pull that
attracts both money and people, leave the outlying areas poor and further
de-populated in relation to their more-urban, and therefore advantaged
counterparts. Inevitably, finance, development, services, culture and
ultimately even presence will focus on the core at the expense of the
periphery. The prospect of a long-term post-merger finance influx
specifically for these smaller towns and villages is doubtful. This can be
illustrated by data showing that for five municipalities of the proposed
South Tsugaru Merger (12 municipalities centered on Hirosaki City), the
annual revenue generated through regional subsidy transfers from the central
government account for just over a quarter of the Hirosaki City municipal
budget for the fiscal year 2002, while for the remaining four towns and
villages, the rate was from a low of 49 percent to a high 61 percent.
Clearly smaller towns and villages depend to a higher degree on such subsidy
transfers—transfers which will be consolidated to be shared both with other
similarly small towns and villages as well as the core city such as Hirosaki
after the merger. It must also be noted that the fixed-cost expenditures
versus revenues ratio for Hirosaki City is also higher, at just under 85
percent for fiscal year 2001, than that of the surrounding towns and
villages, which were just under 80 percent. This suggests that Hirosaki is
burdened with somewhat less budget flexibility, meaning that a consolidation
of regional tax transfers through mergers would benefit the strained budgets
of bigger municipalities more than the less strained budgets of smaller
towns and villages. Complicating this is the present fiscal health of both
small municipalities and larger core cities. As will be noted in the
following section, much attention has been given to the fiscal state of
potential partners in the exploration and proposal of potential mergers. No
core municipality wants to take on a debt-ridden smaller town or village;
likewise no town or village wants to merge with a fiscally-strained core
city.
The perspective of the residents is even
still more complicated, albeit by virtue of questions of information and
understanding. In a preliminary public perception survey of 100 respondents
undertaken in December 2003, Hagiwara found that approximately 40 percent
felt they couldn’t judge whether mergers were necessary or not, with 87
percent stating that they did not have enough information to do so. Hagiwara
questions whether a process characterized by step-by-step progression from
‘problem self-identification’ on the part of residents to ‘issue-dictated
information distribution on mergers’ and ‘opinion formation regarding
mergers’ has occurred. His concern that resident opinion formation based
solely on a ‘leadership agenda’ misses the most important component of
self-determination in a decentralizing system in which local municipalities
see residents taking on increasingly important roles in governing at the
local level is one that can not be ignored.
Aomori Prefecture 2004
The year 2003 opened with a Tōōnippō
newspaper article reporting that over sixty percent of prefectural
municipalities had joined merger councils, the majority still however
Research or Voluntary Merger Councils (Tōōnippō, 2003.1.1). A July 2003
article reported that of 3185 cities, towns and villages nationally,
approximately 1700 were participating in Legal Merger Council actions, a
national average of 44 percent. While Chubu, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu had
the highest rates of participation—over ninety percent in the case of Gifu
and Shimane Prefectures—Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto and Kinki reported low
rates—with Aomori reporting a 34 percent participation rate (Tōōnippō,
2003.7.3). As of January 2004, eight of the 14 geographic areas identified
within Aomori Prefecture have progressed to the Legal Merger Council stage,
with five of those eight having made decisions regarding type of merger,
timing of merger and the name of the merged municipality. Three of the
fourteen were at the Voluntary Merger Council stage, with one still in the
research stage, and two having abandoned efforts. The proposed Hirosaki
block was the largest of the councils numerically, claiming twelve members,
followed by the proposed Hachinohe block and Mutsu-Shimokita block, each
with eight (although the population of the Hachinohe block will vastly
outnumber that of Mutsu-Shimokita). Most other councils are made up of two,
three, four, and five members, with thirteen municipalities unattached.
A close reading of the coverage of merger
activities as reported over the year 2004 in the local Tōōnippō
newspaper reveals the twists and turns of the process and the issues of most
concern that have to be dealt with in some cases and have caused
municipalities to secede from merger efforts in others. A 3 January article
alludes to the debt held by smaller municipalities as a hindrance to
mergers, this because of the post merger necessity of absorbing such red ink
by the core municipality. Over the year successes as well as secessions,
dissolutions and collapses are reported as they occur. A 14 January article
heralds the first prefectural merger to be agreed to, which was then
reported to be made official on 1 July. Summer and fall saw withdrawal,
cancellation or collapse in areas on both sides of the prefecture, most
notably however in the major Pacific-port city of Hachinohe and in the Mutsu
City-centered Shimokita Region.
The major issues identified in the articles
included the increase of council members post merger, the adjustment of
services and the loss of identity that name changes will incur. The merger
of several smaller municipalities with a larger core municipality will
inevitably entail a reduction in the necessary number of resulting municipal
council members, begetting the question of who stays and who goes. Residents
questioned the many changes that will occur in services, regulations and
procedures, with articles describing, for example, ‘welfare office
reductions’ (19 January), the ‘impact of mergers on local lifestyles’ (4
February), the ‘difference in garbage collection categories’ (11 February),
‘water-works post merger?’ (20 February), ‘inquiries regarding the nature of
municipal organizations’ (2 March), ‘negotiations regarding subsurface water
use’ (26 July). The loss of identity was referred to directly in several
articles, with a 24 January article pointing to the emotional attachment to
the names of old countered by the connotation of freshness that emerges with
a new name, concluding that efforts must be made to ‘create a new emotional
attachment to the new names of the region.’ An article the following day
pointed to the difficulty in creating new names, as mergers among the main
districts within the prefecture had proposed 13 names incorporating
identical elements (for example, the use of Tsugaru in the western half of
the prefecture or Nambu in the eastern), thereby minimizing the difference
between such municipalities, and presumably the accordant potential for such
emotional attachment that can be created for such an municipality. That
notwithstanding, new names were emerging throughout the latter half of the
year, as in the joining of Nakasato and Kodomari Villages to form
Nakakodomari Town, the merger of Kizukuri, Morita, Kashiwa, Inakadate and
Shariki Villages to form Tsugaru City, and Sotogahama Town from the merger
of Kanita, Tairadate and Minmaiya Villages.
There were several articles that heralded
the promise of mergers, as in a 24 February article which reported on a
symposium held in Hachinohe City which concluded that ‘mergers would be good
for business, reactivating agriculture and tourism.’ A 28 February article
reports on the sentiments of the local chamber of commerce in Hirosaki that
‘the economic change brought by mergers is welcome,’ with the added
assertion that ‘development is better than keeping an old name.’ In a 26
March article, the prefectural governor weighed in, noting that a key to
aiding the region was the promotion of regional mergers. However, there were
articles citing a time pressure, such as a 8 August article which cites
‘pressure without a reason to merge as the term limit draws near is not
justified.’ There were ripple effects of the merger activity as well, as a
25 January article reported on the merger of 13 local agricultural
cooperatives, forming a merger of seven major merged groups, and a 27
February article reported on the merger of five chambers of commerce in the Tsugaru City area.
While the major cities of their respective
districts, Hirosaki in the western Tsugaru and Hachinohe in the eastern
Nambu, provided the pull to create merger blocks, neither were completely
successful. While undertaking a long series of individual meetings between
the Hirosaki City mayor and the mayors and council members of the potential
members, not only was a Hirosaki-drafted plan rejected due to ‘a lack of
trust,’ by year’s end two municipalities had seceded, citing concerns
regarding the coordination of health care, fire, and garbage services. The
process was in many cases tempered by both idealism on the one hand, as
municipalities prioritized their own independence over mergers, and the
difficult reality of municipal administration and service provision, as
above, on the other. Yet, a calculated appraisal of reality contributed to
support for mergers in other cases, as other municipalities throughout the
prefecture cited population loss and the severity of public finance
constraints as powerful motivating factors for amalgamation.
Several smaller municipalities in the
Hirosaki City-centered Tsugaru South block argued the necessity of a
neighborhood framework complete with extensive explanation meetings for
local residents. To their credit, the Tōōnippō did run several sets
of multiple-column series exploring specific aspects of the merger issue.
The first set considered the paradox of independence versus isolation for
rural municipalities, outlining the financial reality for many as balanced
only be seeking, in the case of an area in western Aomori Prefecture,
independence on the basis of accommodating nuclear power generation and
waste facilities. The second set of columns detailed the controversy
surrounding the post-merger reality of municipal council membership and the
importance of respecting residents’ views. The third set introduced several
opinions held by leaders in government, presenting information on a range of
ideas, from the preferred process of mergers to an outright rejection of
mergers as appropriate policy. The fourth set devoted all the columns to the
first merger in Aomori Prefecture, New Gonohe Town and the fifth set focused
exclusively on the birth of a new Tsugaru City. The sixth set of columns
focused on resident reaction to mergers, noting both resident opposition and
resident acceptance, if not full support, while concluding that any
governmental directive that impinges so directly on local lifestyles
ultimately demands that residents question leadership.
As of September 27, reported in a 1 October
Tōōnippō newspaper article, there was one fully legal merger,
thirteen legal merger councils, and 31 cities, towns, and villages that at
this point are uncommitted. The majority of the mergers are set to be
enacted in March 2005, and will account for a population of 951,098
prefectural residents, the largest being the Aomori Namioka merger with
318,732 and the Hachinohe-Nango merger with 248,608 and the smallest
Sotogahama Town, located at the northern tip of the Tsugaru Peninsula, with
9,170. As of this date, the Hirosaki area, with 13 municipalities, had not
been successful in establishing a merger plan.
Conclusion: the Deadline Approaches; the
Outcome Uncertain
The Heisei mergers were promoted by the
national government with aims related to more efficient utilization and
increased flexibility of local municipalities together with fiscal
improvements in both subsidy provision and the tax system. As described in a
preceding section, six broad areas have been identified as long-term
objectives: social infrastructure, an abundant living environment, health
and welfare, education, industry, and town development. The local aims are,
naturally more locally relevant, identified in the Hirosaki City Merger PR
package as revitalization and infrastructural improvements, maintaining and
improving resident services and strengthening and rationalizing public
finance. The PR plan also alluded to issues and areas of concern, which
together with the description of the Hachinohe merger plan, are revealed in
the progression of articles that appeared in the Aomori-prefectural wide
Tōōnippō newspaper over the course of 2004. These issues and concerns
can be categorized as merger-related issues, which focus primarily on first,
information dissemination to residents and second, post-merger, near-term
council membership, the former which will be resolved by local fiat of
merger councils and the realization of mergers in early 2005 and the latter
by the inevitable reckoning of elections and post-merger accountability.
Perhaps more important, however, are the
locally relevant objectives of the mergers, the realization of which will be
borne out over upcoming years. One major question will be the degree to
which the centripetal forces of the core municipalities can be countered by
the quest for uniformity in plan and equality in outcome with respect to the
smaller outlying areas. This will be particularly true for those mergers
which can be characterized by a major core municipality, present-system
Aomori, Hachinohe or Hirosaki Cities, for example. Other more concretely
defined questions will also emerge. Have these mergers addressed regional
and municipal revitalization? Have these mergers addressed the maintenance
and improvement of resident services? Have these mergers addressed the
efficiency of public finances? As outlined in the brief introduction of
other cases earlier in this paper, the success or failure of the Heisei
mergers, likely apparent only years after the March 2005 deadline, will in
the case of Aomori Prefecture, most probably be dependent less on the
planning and execution of the mergers than on the specific circumstances of
the Tsugaru, the Nambu and the Shimokita Districts of the rural, far-north
of Japan.
Notes
1 From
an unpublished undergraduate thesis, ‘The Influence of Municipal Mergers on
Residents,’ by Hagiwara Koichi, submitted to Hirosaki University, Faculty of
Education, March 2004.
2 The
Tōōnippō is the de-facto prefectural newspaper of Aomori Prefecture,
with a wide readership and high credibility. All translations of articles
titles herein are by the author.
3 The term
gappei is written in the characters meaning together, total, fit,
match, and put together or combine in the first character and put together
in the second. The term gappei can be rendered in English as merger,
amalgamation or consolidation.
References
Carey, Malachy and Srinivasan, A. and
Strauss, R. 1996. Optimal Consolidation of Municipalities: An Analysis
of Alternative Designs. Socio-Economic Planning Science, Vol. 30 (2):
103-119.
Graham, Katherine and Maslove, A. and
Phillips, S. 2001. Learning from Experience? Ottawa as a Cautionary Tale
of Reforming Urban Government. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis:
Research and Practice Vol. 3: 251-269.
Hagiwara, Koichi. 2004. The
Influence of Municipal Mergers on Residents. unpublished thesis
submitted to Hirosaki University, Faculty of Education.
Hirosaki City. 2002. Shi-chō-son
gappei ni-tsuite (Regarding Municipal Mergers).
Ikegami, Hiromichi. 2003.
Shichōson gappei: kore dake no gimon (Municipal Mergers: Only These
Questions). Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyusha.
Japan Research Institute, Limited,
Research and Consulting Division. 2001. Promoting the Municipal
Mergers — Findings of a Survey on the Activities of Voluntary Merger
Councils and Study Groups.
Municipal Merger Assistance Headquarters.
2001.
Municipal Merger Assistance Plan
(Summary); (Provisional Translation). Accessed 30 January 2004.
Nakanishi, Hiroyuki. 2002.
Shichoson gappei: machi no shorai wa jumin ga kimeru (Municipal Mergers:
Residents to Decide the Future of our Cities). Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyusha.
Sancton, Andrew. 2003.
Why
Municipal Amalgamations? Halifax, Toronto, Montreal. Presentation at
Municipal-Provincial-Federal Relations in Canada Conference, May 2003. Accessed
15 February 2004.
Vojnovic, Igor. 2000. The
Transitional Impacts of Municipal Consolidations. Journal of Urban
Affairs Vol. 22; 4: 385-417.
About the author
Anthony S. Rausch is Foreign Lecturer at
Hirosaki University,
Japan and a Doctoral Candidate at Monash
University, Australia. His research interests center on rural Japan and
have focused on volunteerism, education, the media and economic and cultural
revitalization. He has authored and co-authored books on the Tsugaru
District of Aomori Prefecture (tsugaru shamisen and Tsugaru
lifestyle) and is completing his dissertation on cultural commodities in
local revitalization.
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Copyright: Anthony Rausch
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